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POLITICAL RISK AND MNC’s LOCATION DECISION – A 
DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis builds a dynamic modeling tool for analyzing the impact of political 
risk on the production location decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs). The 
choice of location by MNCs involves various decisional factors and the time- dependent 
interactions among them. A sophisticated location analysis has to incorporate these 
complexities in a holistic perspective. The combined impact of learning and political risk 
on the location decision was studied in this thesis through computation simulation. The 
key findings are as follows. a) The cost of operating in a host country increases with 
increasing political risk. Hence, a country with high political risk receives increasing 
investment at a later point in time than a country with lower political risk. From a 
country’s national perspective, FDI policy makers need to focus on reducing the 
transaction cost due to political risk in order to receive earlier investments .b) An 
increased rate of learning by MNCs helps to reduce their transaction costs and this helps 
them expand internationally at an earlier stage compared to a slower learning MNC. A 
fast learning MNC in a risky environment can outpace a slow learner in terms of lower 
operating costs and profitability. It thus follows that MNCs need to consider the risk of 
the host country in combination with their learning capacity when evaluating 
international production locations. c) If the alternative location choice is a cheaper 
destination but has high political risk, smaller MNCs cannot gain a cost advantage by 
investing in such a host country because they lack economies of scale necessary to utilize 
this potential advantage. It only makes economic sense for large MNCs to move their 
production locations to riskier countries for cost advantages. Finally, the dynamic 
methodology employed in this thesis is a novel analytical contribution to the discipline of 
international business. By altering the variables in the simulation model, various 
scenario analyses specific to a firm and country can be performed which can be of value 
for FDI decision makers in a variety of settings including corporate strategy, marketing, 
finance and economic and social policy.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Politics are almost as exciting as war and quite as dangerous. In war, you can only be 
killed once, but in politics many times. 
- Winston Churchill 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalization has created many opportunities; however, it is not without 
significant threats. The political crises in Southeast Asia, Russia, Latin America, and 
Turkey highlight the impact and importance of understanding political risk. During the 
last forty years, the impact of political risk on the world’s economy has been dramatic. In 
the early decades of the 20th century, political risk took the shape of expropriation of 
foreign assets. However, the trend after World War II was towards the post-colonial 
declaration of independence followed by civil war or a take-over by a left-wing 
government, leading ultimately to the nationalization of foreign investors’ properties 
under the twin excuses of national sovereignty and ending exploitation by foreigners. 
Research shows that between 15 to 20 percent of all US foreign direct investment was 
lost to expropriation during the 1970s (Wilkin and Minor, 2001).  
The importance of understanding political risk has long been recognized by both 
investors and the top management of multinational firms. For example, a 2003 World 
Bank Survey reported political risk as the primary concern among investors. A similar 
survey of CEOs reported that the top concern among respondents was the fear of a major 
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disruption in the process of globalization. Almost all the respondents saw political 
risk as a major threat to their corporation’s growth, assets, and operations (Wilkin, 2003).  
Political risk encompasses a broad array of risks and depending on the source of 
origin, the risks can be classified as follows:  
(a) Risks arising from government regulation and the legal Systems: Globalization has 
put increasing pressure on national legal systems. However, developing nations have 
largely inherited dysfunctional legal systems that exhibit corruption, anti-foreign 
sentiment, and political bias. (b) Risks from macroeconomic sources: Political activities 
motivated by financial crises have become more frequent as a result of bringing stocks, 
bonds, and other instruments that are well known in the developed world to emerging 
economies that lack the necessary institutions for successfully managing these 
instruments. (c) Risks arising from the political influence of local firms: Multinational 
companies compete alongside domestic companies from developing countries who use 
unfair political influence to their advantage against foreign investors. (d) Risks arising 
from regional sources: Despite the end of Cold War, political violence among the local 
groups and regional and ethnic conflicts continues to pose a serious thereat for 
international investors. Issues in the Middle – East, the Philippines and Chechnya are 
examples of these kinds of disturbances. (e) Political risk arising from social concerns: 
With increased globalization, developing nations are beginning to show increasing 
concerns towards human rights, labor standards, and the environment. A detrimental 
effect of this positive turn in events is that local special interest groups have developed an 
anti-foreign investor attitude. For example, take the problem of Shell with local groups in 
Nigeria. (g) Risks arising from the threat of terrorist attacks: The world is facing a serious 
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threat from terrorists. The use of suicide bombers and other violent tactics poses a serious 
threat to life and property and is often focused specifically on multinational corporations 
and their employees. (h) Risks arising from volatile democratic processes: A serious 
outcome of democratization is that democratic governments tend to change more often. 
As a result contracts that were signed by the old government are at risk of withdrawal or 
repudiation by a new party. This makes it very difficult for international investors who 
may find it nearly impossible to rely upon the local government’s contracts. (i) Risks 
arising from the decentralization of power: Centralized economies are moving towards 
more democratic processes and as a result local governments are gaining more power. 
Multinationals now have a threat not only from the national government but also from 
local governments which may override contracts made with the national government. 
It is also interesting to note that increase in political risk has not slowed down the 
growth of globalization. The level of foreign direct investment in the past decade has 
increased substantially1. Multinationals are constantly on the lookout for new countries in 
which to operate in order to achieve market expansion, or obtain improved production 
locations, which has resulted in an increase in the flow of FDI worldwide. For instance, 
inflows of FDI to developing countries alone grew by 40% to $233 billion in the year 
2003 to 2004 (UNCTAD, 2005). The global merchandise trade grew by 21% from year 
2003 to 2004 and portfolio investments have seen a similar growth (World Trade 
Organization, 2005). Therefore, given the current trend of increasing globalization and 
political risk, there is a need to understand how political risk affects a multinational firm 
                                                 
1 With the integration of international capital markets, global FDI flows grew strongly in the 1990s at rates 
well above those of global economic growth or global trade. Recorded global inflows grew by an average 
of 13 percent a year during 1990-1997. Driven by cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), these 
inflows increased by an average of nearly 50 percent a year during 1998–2000, reaching a record US$1.5 
trillion in 2000. (Statistics Department, International Monetary Fund, 2003) 
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operating in a host country. With the increase in size of FDI projects, a more holistic 
approach to decision making is needed. Previous authors have attempted to address the 
problem of political risk and their works are described in the literature review section. 
This thesis takes a different approach than that found in the literature analyzing political 
risk. For a start, an MNC does not act as a standalone unit and political risk does not 
impact the firm in isolation. There are other important dynamics that have to be 
considered. For instance, as an MNC invests more in a foreign country, the risk increases 
because the potential loss is greater. This process entails a positive reinforcing behavior. 
The greater the resource commitment, the greater is the risk. At the same time, with 
increased resource commitments, an MNC begins to learn about the operating 
environment and becomes more adept at handling local political risk. In order to 
understand the impact of political risk in the presence of other interacting forces a 
dynamic framework is put forth in this thesis.  
Chapter two describes the research motivation behind the thesis and explains its 
contributions to the field. Chapter three describes the conceptual model for the dynamic 
framework for analyzing the impact of political risk on an MNC. Chapter four explores 
the relevant literature. Chapter five builds a systems dynamics simulation model using 
Vensim© for the components explained in the conceptual framework. Chapter six 
discusses the output of the simulation model and presents various scenario analyses. 
Chapter seven presents the overall interactions between the components of the model 
built in Chapter five and Chapter eight presents the conclusion. 
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THESIS CONTRIBUTION 
Political risk is an important force that affects multinational companies and is one 
of the top concerns for both top managers and investors. A better understanding of 
political risk can help managers and investors formulate strategies to better handle risk. In 
order to understand how political risk affects a firm, the problem needs to be narrowed 
down to more manageable terms. Complexity can then be added to the model in stages. 
For example, a firm can choose to go multinational for reasons varying from sales 
expansion to risk reduction and each of these cases can be a point of departure for study. 
In addition, MNCs face varying degrees of political risk from the time of initial entry into 
the host country until they exit from the country, and these risks come from multiple 
sources.  
The goal of this thesis is to study the impact of political risk on the MNC. As 
mentioned earlier, an MNC may seek entry into foreign location for many reasons from 
resource seeking to market expansion. However, this thesis focuses on the MNC which 
seeks expansion into a foreign country in search of a lower cost production location. The 
motivation for the thesis comes from my earlier work in the area, which explored the 
dynamics behind locational decision making in the multinational firm. This decision is 
not a “one time” event and many interacting forces can alter the location choice. For 
example, scarcity of resources in the host country may make the country less attractive 
over time. That is, when an MNC moves its location to a cheaper country, cost 
differences will make economic sense initially. However, over time, as the MNC uses up 
the resources in that country, resource scarcity can set in and this leads to increases in 
cost, thereby increasing the total cost of international production. As a result, continuing 
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production in the host country may no longer be attractive and the MNC will need to shift 
location either to its home base or to a third destination, if available. How soon this 
resource scarcity sets in depends on various other factors such as the rate of cost 
escalation for domestic and international resources, as well as changes in pricing 
structure and market demand. In order to explore the sensitivity of these variables, a 
simulation model was built and different scenarios were analyzed (Samii, and 
Rajamanickam, 2005). The scope of the study however was limited to production and 
transaction costs. 
In another previous research effort, we focused on the learning of multinationals 
in a host country and explored the impact of this learning on political risk (Samii, 
Rajamanickam, and Thirunavukkarasu, 2005). Here, we argued that when an MNC enters 
a new host country, or is considering entering a host country, it initially faces a very large 
risk. As a result of this anticipated risk, MNCs tend to add an arbitrary risk premium to 
the discount rate of projected cash flows in the project’s valuation and often may reject 
an otherwise attractive project. What MNCs don’t take into account is the impact of 
learning. As time progresses, the unfamiliarity with the host country diminishes and 
therefore, it is not appropriate to add a very large risk premium which is kept constant 
throughout the project. This approach formed the core of the research and we 
demonstrated that by incorporating learning effects, MNCs would be able to accept a 
project that they would otherwise have rejected as unattractive. 
This thesis aims to build upon and integrate previous research results in order to 
explore the impact of political risk and learning on an MNC’s location decision making. 
While there has been an increasing interest in the intersection of risk and international 
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business, empirical evidence is ambiguous about the impact of political risk on MNCs. 
Prior studies that have attempted to explore this relationship have investigated the impact 
of risk either at a country level using an index, or have focused on a particular isolated 
risk event. However, a firm does not operate in isolation and the decisions made by a firm 
depend on a number of different types of factors and the interactions among them. 
Further, political risk events happen at a single point in time, while the behavior of the 
MNC’s decision makers varies over time. Therefore, in order to study the impact of 
political risks on a multinational firm, one must focus on the time path of the impact.  
The contributions of this thesis are threefold. For managers, the model developed 
in the thesis gives a practical tool for developing a holistic understanding of the 
underlying causal and latent factors that influence an MNC’s production location 
decision. This model can thus help them to devise better strategies for handling political 
risk. For investors, knowledge about how political risk influences firm value in the 
presence of other factors, can help them make better investment decisions. Finally, this 
thesis brings a methodological innovation to the study of political risk which may be of 
interest for academicians and practitioners.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Many factors influence the location decision of an MNC. These include cost 
differentials, quality, the capacity of the MNC to adapt to the new environment, the risk 
level of the host country and so on.  Even from a simple cost perspective, the decision to 
go abroad can vary over time. This thesis explores the dynamics behind the location 
decision taking into consideration the impact of learning and political risk. This section 
provides the conceptual framework for the thesis.  While it does not represent the 
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complete, complex dynamic interaction of all the factors that go into location decision, 
this framework serves as the foundation for that research. The dynamic process behind an 
MNC’s location decision making process is shown in Figure 1 and can be broken down 
into three components: a) The impact of learning on the level of risk b) The dynamics 
behind location choice c) The impact of political risk. 
Figure 1: Costs, Political Risk, Learning, and Strategic Decision Making 
 
  
 The case of an MNC engaged in the manufacturing of products is now considered. 
Here, the multinational company is looking for foreign locations to expand its production 
base. According to transaction cost theory, it is assumed that the MNC would prefer the 
location that offers the cheapest total production cost (including transaction cost). The 
first component of the model explores the impact of learning on the risk of the MNC. 
When the MNC evaluates a cost-effective foreign investment opportunity, it initially 
faces a huge risk because of unfamiliarity with operations. The operating climate, the 
rules of doing business, the relationship with the stakeholders etc, are all new and pose 
serious risk to the MNC. However, as the MNC spends more time in the host country, it 
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begins to learn about these operations and becomes more familiar with the local 
environment. This leads to a reduction in the level of risk.  
The second component of the model explores the time path of the location decision of 
the MNC. As the MNC continues to operate in the new location, the initial cost 
difference that made the new location attractive slowly begins to diminish. This situation 
could arise from other competitors entering the country, or simply as a result of a scarcity 
of resources which causes the cost of production to rise. In either case, over time the cost 
difference of the new location declines. This is termed as the risk of ‘scarcity of 
resources’. After a certain point it is possible that the cost structure of the new production 
location declines to the point where it becomes equal to that of the equilibrium stage and 
there is no longer a cost benefit to the MNC. At this point the host country ceases to be an 
attractive location and the MNC looks for an alternative location or chooses not to 
expand further. 
Many factors can affect risk and therefore the cost of operations in the host country. 
One of them is the political risk that the firm faces. The third component of the model 
explores the impact of political risk. When the firm faces the political risk in the host 
country, the total cost of operating in the country increases. As a result, the new country 
may tend to become unattractive at an earlier stage itself.  
The interaction of the scarcity of resources, risk, and learning on the strategic choice 
of location decision making of an MNC is diagrammatically represented in Figure 1 and 
explained below. Three different interactions can be observed in Figure 1 as shown by 
the three arrows. The first is the impact of learning on risk (loop1).  When a multinational 
company is faced with the decision to enter into a foreign location for the first time it 
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initially faces a huge risk. One component of this risk can be attributed to the 
unfamiliarity of the operating environment which tends to make the MNC perceive the 
opportunity as a risky one. This risk can increase the cost of operating in the foreign 
environment. However, as the MNC begins to operate in this new environment, it begins 
to learn about the surroundings and as a result, the risk perception begins to change. 
Learning causes a decline in the level of risk.  
The second loop reflects the strategic decision making process of the MNC. In 
this scenario, an MNC seeks to locate its production facilities among a choice of 
countries. Transaction cost theory argues that the MNC will choose a location that 
minimizes the overall cost of production for the product. However, this decision is not a 
one-time phenomenon, but changes over time as resource scarcity sets in, as new markets 
for production location emerge, and as production locations change over time. This 
dynamic interaction is shown in loop 2. 
 The third interaction shows the impact of political risk on the operations of the 
MNC’s strategic decision process and forms the core of this thesis. While the impact of 
learning reduces the level of risk faced by the MNCs, political risk acts in the opposite 
direction, increasing risk by increasing the cost of doing business. The three loops 
described above act together and determine the production location choice of the MNC 
over time. Each of these loops forms a separate simulation model. The remainder of the 
thesis explains each of these models separately and analyzes the model through 
simulation. Finally, the interaction between all three models is presented. Using the 
integrated model, various firm-specific scenarios and proposed investments can be run in 
order to view the ex-ante impact of policy decisions by the MNC’s managers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The underlying theoretical foundation of the thesis comes from other branches of 
study in addition to those concerned with Political Risk, and can be represented as a 
three-tired structure. At the base level the thesis builds upon the existing literature on 
political risk and its impact on MNCs. This includes the way political risk has previously 
been studied, the decision process of an MNC with respect to the choice of international 
production location and the impact of the learning curve on the MNC. At the second level 
of analysis, the thesis provides a literature review of why a general systems view is most 
applicable to modeling the production location decision of the MNC. Finally the 
literature review examines political risk and the integration of political risk with the other 
components of the model (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Building Blocks of the Thesis 
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POLITICAL RISK AND IMPACT FOR MNCS 
Politically risky environments are usually characterized by instabilities in the 
form of coups d’état, asset expropriations, radical and unpredictable changes in 
government policies, the unforeseen imposition of capital and ownership controls, sudden 
debt crises, and so forth. Pre-entry and post entry decisions for MNC’s rely to a large 
extent on the stability of the host economy because politically induced events such as 
those mentioned above can profoundly affect a firm, whether multinational or domestic. 
For example, a political crises in the form of a coup, may result in a radical socialist 
government coming to power which imposes a policy of expropriation of all foreign-
owned firms as happened in Ethiopia (Kobrin, 1984)). Alternatively, a coup might result 
in a conservative government coming to power which returns expropriated property as in 
Chile after Allende. In some cases, coup d’état may simply replace the governing 
authority without affecting MNCs, however, such political events still tend to introduce a 
general instability in foreign business environments. 
While there is a widespread concern among international managers with respect 
to incorporating political instability issues in the FDI decision-making process, historical 
evidence shows that little is understood about how to actually incorporate the effects of 
such an impact in the firm’s planning. The international business literature presents 
contradictory evidence regarding the effect of political instability and political risk on 
foreign direct investment (FDI). In an early review of studies on political risk Kobrin 
(Kobrin, 1979), concludes that the empirical evidence is inconsistent and mixed 
regarding the effect of political instability on FDI stocks and flows. Subsequent studies 
continue to produce mixed findings. Early research in this area studied the impact of 
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political risk via cross-sectional study, although the phenomenon of political risk is 
actually time dependant. Also, the response of MNCs to political risk will vary based on 
the nature of the industry in which the firm operates, the level of learning about foreign 
environment that the firm acquires, the size of the firm as well as other characteristics 
which are firm-specific. Therefore generalizations can only give a very broad general 
understanding about political risk and political instability and do not allow one to 
extrapolate specific consequences for a specific firm or a specific foreign investment 
decision.  
When a multinational firm operating in a host country is faced with a politically 
risky event, the operations of the firm may be affected and this impact will be different 
for different firms depending upon various firm, industry, and country specific factors. 
Perhaps most importantly, the firm-level impact can result in huge losses. This is 
especially true for developed country multinationals operating in developing nations, 
where the volatility of democratic governments is a serious hurdle for FDI such as the 
case of Enron in India.  
Enron, a US based company, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with the State Government of Maharashtra in June 1992 to build a 2,015 Megawatt power 
plant at a cost of USD 2.84 Billion on a build-own-and-operate (BOO) basis. A 20-year 
Power Purchase Agreement with the State Electricity Board was put in place as of 
December 1993 and specified a tariff rate of 7.5 U.S. cents per Kilo Watt Hour (KWH). 
In February 1995, The Dhabol Power Corporation (DPC) was formed and construction 
was begun with an 80% equity held by Enron, and with GE Captial and Bechtel Inc., 
each holding 10% of the equity. The project faced a serious situation in March 1995 
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when a new government came to power in the Maharashtra State elections. After review 
of the contract, the new government cancelled the project on the grounds of excessive 
costs and potential corruption. DPC had to stop construction and start arbitration 
proceedings. After intense discussions and diplomatic pressure from the U.S. 
Government, the Maharashtra state government agreed to renegotiate the project in 
November 1995. Finally, after more than a year’s delay, the government approved a 
renegotiated contract and DPC restarted construction in December 1996. Enron lost 
US$175 million as a result of the 16 month delay in the project. 
In such cases, what MNCs need is a mechanism to assist the decision making 
process in incorporating a holistic approach. What is needed is a practical tool to allow a 
priori analysis of investments in order to avoid losses and to formulate better strategies 
for dealing with high political risks. 
POLITICAL RISK MEASUREMENT 
Many different definitions of Political Risk have been put forth in the 
international business literature. Empirical research on political risk associated with 
international business has focused primarily on expropriation. Weston and Sorge (1972) 
define political risks as those that “arise from the actions of national governments which 
interfere with or prevent business transactions, or change the terms of agreements, or 
cause the confiscation of wholly or partially owned business property.” The term 
“political risk” occurs frequently in the international business literature and is usually 
used to refer to the unwanted outcomes of a political activity or to government 
interference with business operations. Similarly, other research (Aliber, 1975; Baglini, 
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1976; Carlson, 1969) refers to political risk as some form of governmental interference 
with business operations.  
Using the notion of certainty of unstable events, Kobrin (1979) argues that 
political instability poses a risk to an MNC only when the outcome of the instability is 
uncertain. When there is certainty in the nature of the events, multinationals do not face 
any risk. For example, if it is certain that a new government will come to power in the 
next election and that it will force multinationals to divest a portion of their equity, this 
event should not be considered a political risk because it has no component of 
uncertainty. Even though, the value of the future returns of the firm will be negatively 
affected, the variation in the returns will not be unexpected. However, once uncertainty is 
introduced, political events can affect both the expected value of returns and contribute to 
their variation. In this kind of situation, political events then become a source of business 
risk. For example, suppose the Venezuelan government were to expropriate land from a 
British-owned farm, sparking fears of a large-scale land grab under the leftist government 
(Vidal, 2005) or the Russian government's seizure of Yukos (Ostrovsky, 2005) were all 
events whose outcome was unpredictable. These kinds of political events provoke 
instability and contain a high level of uncertainty. 
Another approach in the literature defines political risk in terms of events. That is, 
political risk is explained as acts or constraints imposed upon a firm. While there are 
differences among individual authors, they (Robert T and Smith, 1972, Nehrt, 1970, 
Rodriguez, Rita M, and Carter, 1976, Shapiro, 1978, Zink, 1973) all identify political risk 
with either environmental factors such as instability and direct violence or with 
constraints on operations such as expropriation, discriminatory taxation, public sector 
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competition and the like. Other authors, (Michael Z. and H. Remmers, 1970, Daniels, 
Radebaugh, Sullivan, 2003, Dymsza, 1972) hint at a definition of political risk simply by 
acknowledging that the political environment is a source of business risk for the firm. 
Robock (1971) distinguishes between “macro risk” where political events result in 
controls on all foreign enterprises (for example, Cuba in 1959-1960) and “micro risk” 
which affects only selected fields of business activity or foreign enterprises with certain 
specific characteristics. 
Root (1972) categorizes political uncertainties in terms of the manner in which 
they affect the firm: (1) transfer-uncertainty about flows of capital, payments, technology, 
people, etc.; (2) operational – uncertainties about policies that directly constrain local 
operations; and (3) ownership/control – uncertainties about policies relating to ownership 
or managerial control. He further suggests that transfer and operational uncertainties arise 
primarily from political/economic events and ownership/control uncertainties arise 
primarily from political/social events. 
The international business literature presents many approaches which study the 
impact of political risks on an aggregate level, such as the Foreign Direct Investment of a 
country, however, the results are inconclusive (Kobrin, 1979). Schneider (Schneider and 
Frey, 1985/2) found that political instability had a negative effect on FDI flows. While, 
Nigh (Nigh, 1985) found in an analysis of 24 countries over 21 years that both inter-
nation and intra-nation conflict and cooperation affect manufacturing FDI flows by US 
firms. Fatehi-Sedeh (Fatehi-Sedeh and Kamal & Hossein M. Safizadeh, 1989) on the 
other hand, failed to find statistical association between political stability and FDI. Other 
cross-sectional studies also disagree. Loree and Guisinger (1995) found that political 
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stability significantly promoted FDI inflows in 1982, but not in 1977. Olibe et al (Olibe, 
Kingsley O & Crumbley, C Larry, 1997) did not find consistent evidence that the 
political risk index influenced US FDI flows to 10 out of 13 OPEC countries. Using data 
for all reported manufacturing plant openings from 1984 to 1987, Woodward (Woodward 
and Rolfe, 1993) found that political stability increased the probability of a country being 
selected as an investment location.  
Some studies have attempted to classify the nature of political risk according to 
new lines of fundamental reasoning. For example, in studying the impact of political 
instability on MNCs, Brewer et al (1983) make a distinction between policy instability 
and political instability. They argue that since an MNC is concerned with political risks 
that affect its normal operations and future profits, it is the policies of the host 
government that are of concern. However, not all government instability result in policy 
changes and therefore, not all political instability affect MNC’s. The study conducted a 
cross-national analysis of 115 countries and found a positive but weak relationship 
between policy instability and political instability. Specifically, only factional changes 
(changes in the composition of the groups holding governmental power in countries 
having competitive party systems) had a moderately strong relationship with policy 
instability. Further, governmental instability was more strongly associated with policy 
instability for industrial countries than for developing countries.  
A somewhat narrower focus was adopted in a number of studies which focused on 
the relationship between FDI and political instability in a sample restricted to the 
manufacturing sector (Green, Robert T and Cunningham, William H, 1975, Stephen J 
Kobrin, 1976, Thunell, 1977). A common finding among these studies was that a direct 
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or simple relationship does not exist between the FDI and measures of political instability 
(Bennett and Robert T. Green., 1972, Green, Robert T and Cunningham, William H, 
1975, Green, Robert T and Smith, Charles H, 1972). For example, Green (1972) 
concluded that political instability did not affect FDI. His study regresses the stocks of 
US firms’ FDI in manufacturing and trade on an index of political instability while 
controlling for gross national product per capita across 46 countries. An insignificant and 
weak relationship was demonstrated between manufacturing FDI and economic, social, 
and political factors. Green et al (Green, Robert T and Smith, Charles H, 1972) found a 
different result, establishing a weak but statistically significant relationship between the 
profitability of US FDI and political instability. Root (Root and Ahmed, 1979) used 
discriminant analysis and further confirmed the weak relationship between the two 
variables. A complex and indirect relationship between FDI and instability was argued 
for in two additional studies. In a longitudinal study by Thunnell (Thunell, 1977), an 
asymmetrical relationship between major “trend” changes in the flow of FDI and a 
number of indicators of elite and mass stability was found. Here, it was argued that a high 
level of mass violence precedes negative trend changes, whereas it takes both a low level 
of violence and a government transfer to generate a positive change. In a study of 48 
countries, Kobrin (1978) found a significant negative relationship between FDI and one 
dimension of intrastate conflict; focused anti-regime violence. The relationship was 
found to be stronger in the presence of an economically rooted conflict and a strong 
administrative capacity of the host country to respond to the conflict. The study 
concluded that political conflict had the highest probability of affecting foreign investors 
19 
when it occurred under conditions which were likely to motivate relevant changes in 
government policy.  
More recently, but still at an aggregate level, Li Quan conducted a pooled time 
series analysis of 52 developing countries (Li and Resnick, 2003) and did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between political instability and FDI inflows. Sethi 
(Sethi et al., 2003) found that political instability, measured by a composite variable on a 
100-point scale, did not influence US FDI flows to 28 countries between 1981 and 2000. 
Globerman (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003) conducted a two-stage analysis of US FDI 
flows to 143 countries from 1994 to 1997, in which the first stage investigated the causal 
factors of the probability that a country would be an FDI recipient while the second stage 
examined the determinants of the amount of FDI received. Globerman and Shapiro found 
that an index of political instability and violence, including armed conflict, social unrest, 
terrorist threats, etc, did not influence the probability of a country receiving any FDI 
inflow, but did reduce the amount of FDI inflow a country received. Again, the 
econometric evidence is mixed and inconsistent across studies. The inconsistency 
between empirical evidence among econometric studies of FDI flows and survey 
evidence has been widely noted in a number of studies of the determinants of foreign 
direct investment (UNCTAD., 1992) 
While the literature has produced mixed evidence, the perspective of managers 
seems to present a different picture. They have stated that any foreign direct investment 
decision making process involves a careful examination of not only the factors relating to 
the external environment but also factors that are specific to a firm. Surveys of MNC’s 
managers indicate that a political condition of the external environment is one among 
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their top concerns and plays a key role in assessing an FDI opportunity (Erol, 1985, 
Kobrin, 1979). Evidence from studies of responses of executives to interviews and 
questionnaires (Aharoni, 1966, Bass et al., 1977) illustrate that political risk and political 
instability are among the most important considerations reviewed when investors make 
location decisions. Porcano (Porcano, 1993) found in a survey of Canadian, British, and 
Japanese firms across 36 industries, that political climate in the host country was 
consistently ranked above 3 on a 5-point importance scale.  
Earlier research on political risk have focused on finding the determinants of risk 
and variables that compose specific risks. Some studies have also found the degree of 
association of the political risk events with foreign direct investment. A common finding 
among the studies is that political risk is a significant factor in determining the 
performance on MNCs. However, studies which analyze and recommend specific 
strategies for MNCs during risky events are scant.  Interviews and survey studies of 
executives of multinational corporations have found that political events are one of the 
most important factors in the foreign investment decision process (Aharoni, 1966, Bass et 
al., 1977, Schollhammer, 1974.). More specifically, executives acknowledge that the 
stability of the host government and the attitude of the host government toward foreign 
investment are the most important considerations in the foreign direct investment 
process.  Given the size of resource commitment of MNCs, one would expect that firms 
would somehow incorporate adequate measures to analyze political risk before entry into 
a country and also devise a strategy for dealing with unexpected crisis situations. 
However, there is little evidence in literature showing the incorporation of political 
assessments in the FDI decision making process of MNCs’. Kobrin (1979) argues that 
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most managers have a poor understanding of the concept of political risk. He states that 
the way political risk is assessed and evaluated and the manner in which political risk is 
integrated into their decision making are “general, unsophisticated, subjective, and 
superficial”. The assessment of political risk and investment decisions, seems to depend 
upon “prevailing attitudes, first impressions, and generalizations on single events 
occurring in the host country” (Formica, 1996). Further, Keegan (1974) and Root (1968) 
note that an international managers’ reliance on systematic environment scanning 
methods in the FDI process is minimal.  
Kobrin (1979) also notes that some of the drawbacks of these studies are that, 
they all focus on political instability, which is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for changes in policy relevant to foreign investment. Secondly, the studies all 
focus on the aggregate level of investment for analysis when the risk posed by the 
markets is primarily dependant on the industry, the firm, and even project specific 
factors. This is a profound variable mis-match.  Finally, all of these studies embody 
major data and methodological constraints resulting from the use of composite indices of 
instability and the use of cross sectional techniques in their investigations. In political risk 
studies, a generic approach will lead to inaccurate results. As Erol (1985) points out, 
traditionally, research in the area of political risk and its relationship to foreign direct 
investment, involves analyzing data from a broad range of countries and differing 
industries. This kind of grouping of data will fail to capture the country specific, industry 
specific, firm specific, and even project specific characteristics that are important in 
understanding the impact of political risk. For example, some industries may be more 
vulnerable than others to specific risks. Some companies may be better at handling risk 
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than others. Fatehi et al (Fatehi-Sedeh and Kamal & Hossein M. Safizadeh, 1989) show 
evidence for the fact that when faced with a similar political turbulence, multinational 
corporations from different industries perceive risk in varying degrees although they are 
all operating in the same country. However, the usefulness of such conclusions is a 
function of the specificity to which they can be applied. 
Authors conducting firm level research often suggest some kind of adjustment to 
the yearly cash flows of the project, in order to deal with political risk. Robock (1971) for 
example, shows that political risk can be incorporated by making adjustments to the 
expected cash flows of a firm or by adjusting the discount rate employed to value a 
project at the anticipated times of political risk. In general, the adjustment is made in 
proportion to the magnitude of the risk employed to value a project. Stobaugh (1969) 
suggests advancements in the estimation of cash flows by using a “range of estimates” 
and “risk analyses” that provide probability distributions and expected values for risky 
cash flows. Similarly a market determined approximation of a certainty equivalent has 
been suggested by Stonehill and Nathanson (1968). Here, they suggest the inclusion of 
the cost of a program of uncertainty absorption to each period’s incremental cash flows, 
in order to account for the purchase of additional information, insurance, hedging and so 
forth. Given the probability of expropriation at a point in future, Shaprio (1978) employs 
a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to explore non-systematic risks and then develops 
a CAPM-based technique to adjust the requisite cash flows. While these studies have 
improved the understanding of political risk by employing a firm level approach, they 
have largely focused on the incorporation of risk in isolation, and so have failed to 
capture other important factors that may affect the FDI decision making process. 
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RISK AND THE IMPACT OF LEARNING 
In studying the impact of risk on an ‘MNC, it is essential to take into account the 
impact of learning by the MNC. Research demonstrates that FDI risk does not stay 
constant over time and that the response of the MNC to risk depends to large extent on its 
past behavior and on learning from experience (Kobrin, 1979). For example, if an MNC 
successfully lived through a financial crisis, then it will generally be better equipped to 
handle a future potential risky event of that type than a firm that is new to the 
environment and does not have much experience. 
When an MNC is faced with a decision to enter a foreign environment, it initially 
faces a high risk due to unfamiliarity with the operating conditions and therefore must 
employ a higher risk premium in evaluating the investment. This risk arises due to the 
firm’s unfamiliarity with operating conditions and is termed as “competitive risk” unique 
to the operating firm and the foreign environment. However, in practice, one can observe 
that as MNC’s spend more time in the foreign operating environments they commit 
resources incrementally, indicating a greater degree of conformity with both the 
environment and the investment. For example, the case of Timken Corporation, (which 
was founded in 1899 in St. Louis, Missouri) is an example of the ways in which learning 
reduced the risk of entry into Europe (In this case, entry into Mackenzie and McKern, 
2003). Timken Corporation, a leading manufacturer of highly engineered bearings and 
alloy steels recognized the significance of economic liberalization in Central Europe as 
an opportunity to expand their production capacity. Timken began seeking potential 
acquisitions in the region. The company started discussions with the Polish government 
in 1994 for the acquisition of FLT Prema Milmet S.A., a bearings manufacturer based in 
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Poland. The acquisition was finalized in 1996 and Timken became the first foreign 
investor to own 100% of a previously state owned asset. Although Poland was at the time 
a small and an unsophisticated market, the Polish investment project served Timken as a 
valuable learning platform. Timken was subsequently able to successfully formulate a 
new strategy and develop an improved model for expansion into Europe. This example 
illustrates how over time, MNCs become increasingly familiar with doing business in 
their new surroundings and how their perception of risk can then decline. 
Risk can be defined as a situation in which the outcome is uncertain, and for 
which a number of different possibilities exist, each with its own probability distribution. 
Economists usually define risk as a measure of the dispersion of a probability 
distribution, with the greater the dispersion the higher the level of risk (Aharoni, 1966). 
In this context, risk for an MNC in the case of FDI arises when a multinational company 
is faced with an investment decision overseas for which a number of possible outcomes 
exist each with its own probability distribution. Epically, this risk is embedded in the 
discount rate used for the FDI decision evaluation. For the purposes of analysis, FDI 
investment risk can be broken down into the following three components. The first 
component is company risk, which is the risk faced by the company in its home market. 
The second component is country specific risk, is define as the risk which is faced by all 
of the companies that enter the particular country in question. This is also the unexpected 
institutional risk and refers to the risk of being taken over by the government of a country 
(expropriation), the risk of social acceptability and sovereign risk (which is the risk of  
intervention of governments in contractual agreements) (Miller and Lessard  2000). This 
variable encompasses the political risk, the incorporation of which is one of the main 
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subjects of this thesis. The third component is competitive risk and refers to the 
unfamiliarity of the parent company with the new operating environment.2 Competitive 
risk is particularly important for a firm that enters a country for the first time and it is 
unique to that firm. That is, 
Total Risk = f (rcompany, rcountry, rcompetitive) 
In order to reflect the risk of unfamiliarity of operations in the foreign 
environment, firms add a suitable risk premium based on their perception of the 
uncertainty of operating in the foreign environment. This risk premium arises because of 
a lack of knowledge about the operating environment and is specific not only to the firm 
involved but also to the operating environment. For example, in some countries, Such as 
India, local business groups are very powerful and penetrating the market requires 
insightful knowledge about the way local businesses deal with each other and with the 
bureaucratic system. Lack of knowledge in this area poses a risk that is unique to the firm 
and the target country under consideration. However, the choice of risk premiums in most 
of those cases is arbitrary because they do not take into account either the exact nature of 
the risks involved or the ability of the firm to manage those risks (Lessard, 1996). As a 
result, companies often undermine their own projected cash flows and excessively 
discount the NPV of the project, thereby inaccurately and excessively compensating for 
risks and uncertainty which may lead them in approximately rejecting an otherwise 
attractive project.  
Figure 3 illustrates the traditional method of evaluating an overseas investment 
project. The abscissa represents the duration of the project in years and the ordinate 
                                                 
2 This risk is similar to the private risk introduced by Miller and Lessard (2000)in analyzing  Large 
Engineering Projects.  
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represents the present value of the project’s cash flows at different times (t). In the 
traditional method, a single discount rate is used to discount future cash flows 
irrespective of the fact that companies learn about the environments in the initial years of 
operation that allows for a reduced discount rate in subsequent years. The use of a single 
discount rate during the initial investment period can be attributed to the high risks faced 
by companies during this period. However, the continued use of a steady discount rate 
cannot be justified on the same grounds and it can be argued that this is a negative result 
of path dependency or rigidity of firm strategy. As a result of this methodology, the 
present value of cash flows is decreasing over time and under these conditions, the NPV 
of the project may appear to be negative (thereby making it unattractive) when in fact the 
learning adjusted actual NPV is positive. 
Figure 3: Traditional Method of Project Evaluation 
 
 
Miller and Lessard (2000) have focused extensively on unfamiliarity risk, which 
they term private risk in the context of large infrastructure projects. However, in the 
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context of FDI, since MNCs spend more time in the foreign environment during the 
initial stage of investment, there is a strong possibility for the decline of unfamiliarity 
over time as a result of the learning process (Pedersen and Petersen, 2004).  
The competitive risk and hence the ex-post risk premium should decline over time 
as a result of learning about the business and the competitive environment of the 
country3. This impact, which is typically the learning curve effect has been well studied 
in the context of systems dynamic models. 
  The concept of the learning curve was first introduced in the defense industry 
during the 1920s, where it was used to explain the phenomenon of declining labor costs 
(Ghemawat, 2002). Extensive work has been done on the impact of learning and the 
shapes of learning curves in organizational and production settings (Ghemawat, 1985). In 
addition, there is a great deal of empirical evidence suggesting that enterprises learn how 
to improve labor productivity while producing more output (Renshaw, 1979). According 
to the Boston Consulting Group, the cost of value added declines 20-30 percent each time 
accumulated experience is doubled (Henderson, 1974). Extending this argument to of 
multinationals, it can be argued that improvement in performance can be equated to a 
reduction in competitive risk as reflected by the discount rate (r) and an increase in 
practice can be equated to the number of years the multinational spends in a particular 
country (t) then, the incremental improvement (decrease) in the discount rate is a function 
of the relative increase in the time spent in learning about the particular foreign country.  
                                                 
3 This is the learning (Experience) curve effect as it applies to FDI and is a measure of the potential 
understanding of the foreign competitive environment. We do not distinguish between the Learning curve 
and the Experience curve in the context of this paper. However, the Boston Consulting Group proposed the 
term Experience curve in 1966 for the overall cost behavior and distinguished this from the Learning Curve 
concept. The Learning curve, on the other hand, applied to only labor cost that declined as experience 
accumulated (Bruce D. Henderson, 1974). 
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The traditional treatment of learning curve analysis argues that a given percentage 
change in the cumulative volume of output will provide a constant percentage rate 
decrease in the cost of the last unit produced. Figure 4 shows the effect of cumulative 
volume (on the X axis) on unit cost (on the Y-axis) for a component. The curve follows 
Equation (1) (Allen 1994, Keat and Young 1992). 
Cq = aqb     (1) 
  
Where,   
C = Expected cost of the qth unit  
a = the cost of the first unit 
b = a negative constant 
 
Figure 4: Traditional treatment of learning curve 
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Equation (1) can also be plotted on a logarithmic scale by using the following 
equation (2), which is arrived at by taking the logarithm of equation (1): 
Log Cq = log a + b(log q)    (2) 
As the cumulative volume of output increases, the cost of each succeeding unit falls 
because of higher input productivity. Most learning curves are drawn on the assumption 
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of a constant percentage rate of decrease in unit cost as cumulative volume increases 
(Allen, 1994). 
In studying the impact of political risk on MNC, the value of learning needs to be 
property incorporated. While there are many different kinds of learning and each is 
affected by different factors, this distinction is not relevant to the area of inquiry covered 
in this thesis. Rather the impact of early learning and late learning is explored in the 
MNC’s investment context. In Chapter 6 of the thesis, the impact of learning on risk 
reduction is explored through computational simulation. 
POLITICAL RISK AND CHOICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
PRODUCTION LOCATION 
A multinational enterprise (MNE) organizes the production of goods and services in 
more than one country, and usually, this involves the transfer of assets or intermediate 
products without any change in ownership. In the literature on FDI and MNC, several 
strands of theoretical explanations have been developed to explain why firms engage in 
international production. Some scholars (e.g., Hymer, 1976) view FDI as the result of 
structural market imperfections and the firm’s desire to pursue monopoly status using its 
firm specific assets. Other scholars (e.g., Buckley, and Casson, 1976, Rugman, 1981) 
look at FDI as a way to resolve opportunistic behaviors in market transactions, that is, as 
exerting direct hierarchical control over foreign production, instead of servicing the 
market by other means such as trade. Still others (Vernon, 1971.) consider FDI as the 
firm’s response to the technological maturity of its products and growing demand in 
foreign markets.  
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The eclectic paradigm presented by Dunning (1988, 1993) ties these explanations into 
a single OLI framework. Dunning argues that national firms become transnational to 
exploit three types of advantage: (1) a firm’s advantage due to ownership (O) over 
tangible and intangible assets, (2) the firm’s internalization (I) advantages from its 
hierarchical control of cross-border production, and (3) the location-specific (L) 
advantages perceived by firms with respected to the characteristics of host countries in 
terms of their economic environments or government policies. In other words, a firm 
carries out FDI when the location and its ownership advantages make production abroad 
profitable and the direct hierarchical control of production is preferred over alternative 
modes of satisfying demand (e.g., licensing or trade). 
Obviously, the decision to locate a production facility in a particular location by a 
multinational company is impacted by many factors. As mentioned earlier, one of the 
reasons a firm chooses an international production location is the cost advantage provided 
by the international location. However, there are also disadvantages to this decision in 
terms of added risk to the firm and potential problems of scarcity of resources in the new 
environment. The risk component can also be reduced as the multinational company 
spends more time and resources in learning about the new country. A foreign location 
may seem attractive to an MNC based on a low total cost of production. However, over 
time as the demand for labor in that location increases, the cost differentials may vanish, 
thereby leading to cost equalization. In the long-run the location may not be viewed as 
being as attractive as it was initially. At this point a third country may emerge as an 
attractive new location and production would shift there. A systems dynamic approach 
was employed to illustrate the dynamic nature of the choice of production location.  
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 An overview of the model developed in this thesis is presented in Figure 5. A 
multinational firm that is located in the home country (Country A) is considered. Initially 
it is involved in manufacturing its products domestically.  The company decides its level 
of production based on market demand plus the growth of incremental demand in the 
market. The product is ultimately sold in the market at a suitable price. In this model it is 
assumed that the final market for the product is the domestic market.  
Figure 5: Overview of International Production Locations Model 
 
 The parent company seeks to establish new production locations upon exhausting 
the capacity of local production. The firm makes the decision to expand internationally 
based on the cost of production and transaction costs. Country B and Country C are the 
two options available for this company. The firm chooses the country that has a minimum 
cost of expansion (the total of production cost and transaction cost). The parent company 
can either shift its entire production to this new country or can shift only the incremental 
demand to the new location. In either case, there are distinct feedback-mechanisms that 
would change the production location choices over time.  
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For example, as production expands to country B, the demand for resources in 
country B goes up. As a result, prices begin to escalate and depending upon the scarcity 
of the resources available the cost advantages begin to disappear. This trend is observed 
in Figure 6, which graphs hourly worker compensation costs in US dollars for production 
workers in the manufacturing sector. 
Figure 6: Comparative cost of manufacturing cost in US Dollar, 1975-2000 
 
Source: (Sparks et al., 2002) 
 Observing the costs for the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIE) and 
Mexican economies, it can be seen that the wage rate of the Asian NIEs labor was 
cheaper until 1985 after which the demand for Asian labor forced price equalization As a 
result, the wage rate of the Asian NIEs became relatively unattractive after 1985, while 
Mexican labor became cheaper. A similar trend can be observed between the US and 
Canada. In the system dynamics model presented in this thesis when country B has 
exhausted its resources, then at a certain point, a third country, Country C begins to look 
more attractive and production shifts to country C.  
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SYSTEMS THINKING AND MNCS 
Many overlapping perspectives exist in the literature which attempt to explain the 
choice of production locations by multinational companies. Arguments from the fields of 
international trade (Calvet, 1981), offshore production, product life cycle (Vernon 1966, 
Stopford and Wells 1972) foreign direct investment (Dunning 1988,Hymer 1960 and 
Rugman 1986), and market failure (Casson 1982, Dunning 1988; Dunning and Rugman 
1985, Hymer 1960; Kogut 1983,1985; Prahalad and Doz 1987; Teece 1987) can be knit 
together in order to explain this phenomenon. However, to date there has been no single 
overarching and dynamic framework which explains the process of firm location 
selection and the dynamics behind the choice of location.  
Transaction cost theory argues that when the cost of transaction in the external 
market (i.e. external transaction) is less than the cost of transaction within the firm (i.e. 
internal transaction) then firms will choose to move their activities to the market 
(Williamson 1979, 1985).  A large pool of activities go into the sale of a finished product, 
ranging from basic research and development to product design, and from the preparation 
and installation of machinery and to the production of components, assembly, packaging, 
marketing, transportation, and after-sales support. For all of these activities, a firm must 
choose where to locate its activities. From a traditional transaction cost perspective, this 
decision boils down to the trade off between the cost of running a larger and less-
specialized organization (in the case of internalization) versus the costs that arise from 
the search frictions and imperfect contracting which characterize market transactions. In 
the other words, internalization leads to an increase in the size of the firm, and it is well 
known from principal agent theory, that as the size of the firm increases, the associated 
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agency costs also increase (Williamson, 1985). Further, a vertically integrated firm may 
face higher costs in the  production of components and services because such a firm has 
many divisions to manage and the organization may not benefit from the learning curve 
effects which comes from specialization in a single activity. On the other hand, search 
costs arise when a firm must search for suitable partners and then provide these partners 
with the necessary incentives to produce inputs to the contracting firm’s specifications. 
Search costs embody their own problem as they are often large in magnitude and contain 
a significant level of uncertainty due to imperfect contracting. The decision as to whether 
or not a firm will seek international expansion depends on the over all tradeoffs between 
the costs and the benefits of the two alternatives. If the agency costs outweigh the 
transaction costs, then it will be beneficial for the company to engage in overseas 
production.  
A general systems approach to understanding the multinational firm was first put 
forward by Casson in 1990. A more formal model was subsequently put forth by Buckley 
and Hashai (2004) In this model, the world was portrayed as a grid of locations from 
which the firm will chose the location for its various activities based on a complex set of 
decisional criteria. The Bueckley and Hashai model provides a basis for testing 
hypotheses on the number of firms that will exist in a global system. However, the  
Buckley-Hashai model is still static in nature and does not focus on the kind of 
interactions proposed in the model developed of this thesis. 
One interesting dimension of systems dynamics focuses on mental models of the 
world. Here, general systems theories typically posit that the decisions made by managers 
are based on not the “real” world but rather are based on decision makers’ mental models 
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of the world. It is argued that studying mental models may have some advantages over 
studying empirical phenomenon. For example, in this context it is possible to take into 
account a richer set of information than just numerical data c) A model in this context 
may be more flexible than a simple empirical representation and may be more adaptable 
to new situations allows decisions to be modified as new information becomes available. 
Some of the drawbacks of using mental models as an explanatory variable are that they 
are not easily understood by others and interpretations of models will differ across 
people. Also, the assumptions on which such models are based are usually difficult or 
impossible to examine directly, so ambiguities in the model may go undetected and 
remain unresolved. Systems dynamics has long been used to study the dynamics of 
systems such as the one described in this research. It was first started by Forrester, and 
has subsequently been used by others to study the dynamics of more complex systems 
(Forrester’s market Growth Model (1968), the People Express Management Flight 
Simulator (Sterman 1988), learning curves and word of mouth in market saturation 
(Paich and Sterman 1993) and so on. Computer models have the ability to reflect the 
dynamics behind actual systems. While mental models cannot state the explicit 
assumptions behind a model and the various interactions among the variables, system 
dynamics simulation models can show the explicit assumptions and how they affect the 
working of a system. Not only explicit assumptions, but ambiguous and hidden 
assumptions can also be revealed and examined in the simulations. As the complexity of 
the problem increases, computer models become more reliable in predicting the future 
dynamics of the system. One can easily analyze how the assumptions in the model will 
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affect among themselves and also the future behavior of the overall system (Forrester 
(1971)). 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPLANATION OF MODELS 
This chapter gives an explanation of the different components of the simulation 
model. 
Figure 7 shows the overall design of the three components of the model as described 
in the conceptual overview. In explaining the firm’s location decision, a systems dynamic 
model was built using Vensim©. The advantage of building a systems dynamic model is 
that it can be simulated for different scenarios by altering the model’s assumptions, and 
also each of the components can be analyzed both individually and in combination. These 
components will be explained in detail starting with the mathematical construction of the 
model followed by an explanation of the mathematical equations used in this systems 
dynamic model. The following figure gives an overview of the three components that will 
be described: a) The Learning curve b) Location Choice and c) Political risk. 
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Figure 7: Overview of model components 
 
 
LEARNING CURVE MODEL 
VALUING THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY – A REVISED MODEL 
 
The Net Present Value (NPV) technique for project valuation involves the 
estimation of future cash flows and then discounting them to present value. If E(FCFt) is 
the expected cash flow at time t, and I0 is the initial investment, then the NPV over n time 
periods is computed by summing the discounted expected future cash flows at a steady 
discount rate (r1) as follows,  
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As has previously been discussed, because firm leaning is not taken into 
consideration, this traditional method of evaluating a project underestimates future cash 
flows and therefore underestimates the net present value of the project. To illustrate this 
concept, consider the evaluation of the same project incorporating the assumption that 
multinationals learn and become familiar with the foreign operating environment. In this 
case, the discount rate gradually reduces ex-ante because of the reduction in competitive 
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risk. Following this logic, the discount rate at each time period is decreased by a fraction 
α, which we shall term as the learning curve factor. This rate of learning (α) depends on a 
number of firm specific factors such as the training given to the employees, the nature of 
the firm, its past experiences with FDI and other similar factors. Our concern here is how 
to incorporate this learning effect into the discount rate and as a result into the project 
evaluation. If rt represents the discount rate at the time t and the discount rate at the time 
t-1 is, r(t-1) then, as previously explained rt is composed of company risk, country risk, and 
competitive risk. Country specific political risk is dealt with in a separate chapter 
(Political Risk). Owing to learning, the rcompetitive and therefore the total risk rt is assumed 
to decline over time that is )1( 1 α−= −tt rr , where α is a constant. However, this decline in 
the discount rate does not continue forever but rather reaches an equilibrium value over 
time, when rcompetitive becomes zero. After this point there is no further reduction. The 
discount rate remains constant and is composed of only company and country risk 
(rcompany, rcountry) similar to its competitors. If this constant equilibrium is represented by 
req, then  
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Taking the effect of learning into account, if (NPVmodified) represents the learning 
incorporated NPV of the investment, then, 
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An ex-ante value of the discount rate in the equation (4) is considerably higher 
than the ex-post value due to learning curve impact and the ability to address competitive 
risk.  
Computing the difference between the present values of the future cash flows 
between the two methods, it can be seen from equations (5) and (6) that, the present value 
of the individual cash flows are understated in the traditional method. At any time t, the 
present value of the future cash flows as given by the traditional and the proposed new 
method is as follows,  
∏
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The magnitude by which the cash flows are underestimated in the traditional 
method when the effect of learning is not incorporated in obtained by the difference 
between equations (5) and (6). 
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Hence, the Future Cash Flows at each time period are underestimated in the traditional 
method by a factor of, 
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The above equation shows the difference between the ex-ante (estimated) cash 
flows and the ex-post (actual) cash flows attributed to the learning curve effect. This 
difference is the value of learning and it accumulates over time and causes the 
underestimation of project value in traditional NPV analysis. The greater the value of this 
factor, the higher is the value of the learning. It can be seen that the value of learning 
directly depends on the value of α (the learning curve factor) and time. A higher value of 
α implies that the rate of learning for companies is large and this would causes the value 
of the investment opportunity to increase substantially. The above derivation assumes 
that learning begins at the time of entry. As a result of this assumption, a reduction in the 
discount rate is seen from year 2 onwards. However, this kind of effect might not always 
be present. Depending on numerous external factors, some companies learn slowly and 
this has to be factored in to the equations valuing any specific location decision. 
Nevertheless, the learning adjusted value will always be higher than traditional net 
present value. It can also be argued the sooner a company begins to learn, the greater will 
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be the value of the investment. These scenarios can be simulated and the results are 
shown in the next chapter. 
In order to build a systems dynamic model, the various elements of the firm 
location decision have been broken down into causal loops as shown Figure 8. Two 
forces interact when an MNC is faced with a risky event. The first is the disruption in the 
firm’s operations, which could have a negative (positive) impact on the firm value 
thereby further increasing (decreasing) risk. Under initial entry, the time spent in the host 
country is substantially less and therefore learning is also less. This means that the 
unfamiliarity of operating in the host country is greater and therefore the firm faces more 
risk. 
Figure 8: Causal Loops in the Learning Model 
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The other opposing force is the effect of learning of an MNC. When an MNC 
operates in an uncertain environment, it initially faces a very large risk because of 
unfamiliarity with the environment.  However as time spent in the host country increases, 
the learning factor accumulates. This leads to a reduction in unfamiliarity with the 
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operating environment and this reduces the (perceived) risk. The analysis of risk for the 
firm location decision thus naturally requires a time-dependent framework, which is 
provided here by a systems dynamic model.  
Building the simulation model 
Model for the Future Cash Flows of the Project 
Figure 9 shows the systems dynamic model for analyzing the impact of learning 
on multinationals. In this model an MNC that is considering investing in a host country is 
first chosen. The MNC evaluates the investment using a discounted cash flow method. 
Figure 9: Impact of Learning curve 
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The present value of the future cash flows is represented by the variable “PV of 
Cash In Project” and this is the variable of interest for the model. During the course of the 
simulation this variable provides the discounted value of future cash flows in the project. 
It represents the present value of the cash inflows less the cash outflows (revenue minus 
expenses) in the same manner that the cash flows would be computed in a standard NPV 
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analysis. Revenues include the sales revenue computed as the product of sales price and 
sales volume. Costs include depreciation, tax expenses, and other operating expenses. 
The cash flows are discounted using a discount factor (1 + discount rate) and the discount 
rate at each time period is set to decline at a constant rate of “Alpha”, which is set at the 
beginning of every simulation run depending on the rate of learning accumulated by the 
MNC. The ’Final Equilibrium Discount Rate’ is the final equilibrium value of the 
discount rate at which point the competitive risk becomes zero and the total risk faced by 
the firm is equivalent to that of its competitors. The discount factor at every time period 
depends on the discount factor in the previous time period and this dependency is 
incorporated in the model. The discount rate used in the computation of the discount 
factor also has a time dependency (it declines by a fraction every time period) as shown 
in the model. The model was subsequently simulated and four different scenarios were 
considered, each of which will be explained in the following chapter. 
CHOICE OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION LOCATION 
The second component of the conceptual framework (Chapter 3) is the location 
choice of multinationals and is the focus of this section. An MNC operating in the 
manufacturing sector is considered under a stable pricing strategy and a perfectly 
competitive market structure. To increase profit the firm focuses on cost reduction 
through international operations. In the simplest form, a single multinational firm having 
its production located domestically as the initial condition is considered. The firm 
produces a quantity equal to the market demand (Total Production = Market Demand). 
The total cost of production is the sum of total domestic production cost and the total cost 
of international production. The cost of international production is zero because all the 
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inputs are produced domestically. This total cost of international production is 
represented as follows: 
Ctot= (Qd * Ud) + (Qi * Ui) = (Qd * Ud) + (0 * Ui)                                          (8) 
 Ctot – Total Cost 
 Qd  - Quantity produced domestically 
 Ud  - Domestic unit cost of production 
 Qi – Quantity produced internationally 
 Ui – International unit cost of production 
 
Unit domestic cost and unit international cost are the cost of producing one unit of the 
input domestically and internationally respectively. The unit international cost is 
composed of two components. One is the transaction cost (Ct) and the other is the product 
cost (Pi). If Ii is the rate of cost escalation in the country then the international product 
cost at time t+1 can be represented in terms of the cost at time at t and the rate of cost 
increase as follows.  
  Ui = Ct + Pi                                                                                            (9) 
    Pi,t+1 = Pi,t (1+ Ii)                                                              (10) 
Pi,t+1 = International product cost at time t+1 
 Pi,t = International product cost at time t 
Ct = Unit transaction cost 
Ii = Rate of international cost escalation  
 
Along the same lines, the unit domestic cost is defined as follows and grows over time 
with the rate of growth of domestic cost escalation. 
    Pd,t+1 = Pd,t (1+ Id)                                                             (11) 
Pd,t+1 = Domestic product cost at time t+1 
 Pd,t = Domestic product cost at time t 
Id =  Rate of domestic cost escalation  
 
46 
The quantities of domestic and international production depend on the cost of 
domestic and international production. According to transaction cost theory, if the cost of 
domestic production were lower than the cost of international production (inclusive of the 
transaction costs) then the firm would choose to produce domestically. If the domestic 
costs become higher, then for the sake of simplicity it is assumed that the firm closes its 
domestic operations and chooses to produce internationally. This is the base case scenario 
where it is assumed that the firm would shut down its domestic operations and move its 
entire production to the international location. A systems dynamic model is constructed 
based upon the above assumptions. The final price of the product and the market demand 
are set to grow at a steady rate of 5%. The total revenue is calculated, from which the 
profit (Revenue minus the Cost) is also computed. 
Figure 10 shows the systems dynamic model. ‘Production domestic (qty)’ represents 
the quantity of goods produced locally. An MNC operating in the home country and 
seeking alternative production locations is considered. Country B and Country C are the 
two choices available. The variables belonging to the home country A are shown in bold 
faced type, those for country B are shaded, and the variables of country C are underlined. 
The quantity of production depends on the ‘market demand’, which grows at the rate of 
‘growth of demand’. ‘Unit production domestic cost’ is the unit cost of manufacturing 
domestically which grows at the rate of ‘growth of unit domestic cost’. This growth in the 
domestic cost can be attributed to inflation, competition, and other market forces. 
‘Incremental Quantity’ is the excess demand that is not served by domestic production. 
The firm seeks alternative production location for producing this incremental quantity. 
‘Profit’ is computed as the difference between ‘Revenue’ and ‘total cost for the parent 
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company’. ‘Unit production cost (B)’ represents the unit cost of production in country B.  
‘Transaction Cost (B)’ represents the unit transaction cost of operating in country B. 
‘Total unit international cost (B)’ is the sum of the production cost and the transaction 
cost of operating in country B.   
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Figure 10: Choice of International Production Locations 
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Production is moved to country B if the total cost of production in country B 
(including the transaction cost) is less than the total cost of domestic production. ‘Qty in 
country B’ represents the quantity of goods produced internationally. ‘Incremental 
international production in B’ represents the incremental demand that can be absorbed by 
the production facilities in country B without exceeding the cost of domestic production. 
‘Scarcity factor (B)’ represents the rate at which the scarcity of resources set in. As more 
and more production shifts to the international location, those resources may not 
adequately support demand, depending on the nature of the country. As a result of 
resource scarcity, costs increase. Similarly variables for country C are also defined (the 
top structure of the model). If the total production cost in country B exceeds the domestic 
production cost, then the model looks for an alternative cheaper location. When country 
C appears attractive, the model allocates production to country C.  Various scenarios 
based on the model are considered in the next chapter. 
POLITICAL RISK 
This section describes the model for the third component outlined in the conceptual 
overview, namely political risk. The impact of political risk on an MNC is analyzed in a 
dynamic framework, taking into consideration the impact of learning. The following 
section explains the impact of political risk on the MNC operating in an international 
location. 
Consider the case of a multinational firm operating in the manufacturing sector in 
home country A. It is initially involved in manufacturing products locally.  The company 
decides its level of production based on demand and the growth of demand in the market. 
The product is finally sold in the domestic market at a suitable price. The parent company 
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seeks to establish new production locations upon exhausting the capacity of local 
production. It makes the decision to expand internationally based on the cost of 
production and on transaction cost. The total unit cost of international production is 
therefore the sum of the international manufacturing cost and the transaction cost.  
Ωt = Γt + Τt                                                     (12) 
Where, 
Ω = Total Unit International Cost 
Γ = International Manufacturing Cost per Unit 
Τ = Transaction cost per Unit 
 
Based on transaction cost theory, the firm decides to look for international 
production if the cost of domestic production exceeds the total unit international cost. If 
the international location is cheaper, then production shifts to the international location.   
Various other factors come into play in the decision for the choice of international 
location however; the influence of political risk is the focus of this thesis.  
If the international location poses a politically risky environment, then the cost of 
doing business increases, and the location may appear to be unattractive. The costs of 
doing business may add up for example, because of corruption, the difficultly of getting 
the work done through multiple levels of bureaucracy, the threat of expropriation, 
potential loss due to political activities, a shift in industrial and sectoral polices and so on. 
Therefore, political instability can be treated as a cost of doing business and is modeled 
as a part of transaction cost as follows. 
Τt = Φt + εt                                                                      (13) 
Where, 
Τ = Transaction cost 
Φ = Cost of Political Risk to the firm  
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ε = Other Transaction costs. 
 
This method of treating political risk as a transaction cost ties in closely with the 
general accounting and financial norm of treating risk as a cost and adding a premium for 
compensation. A typical example of this approach would be offshore projects, which are 
generally viewed as more risky and which are seen as contributing less to shareholder 
value, than an otherwise comparable domestic investment. To reflect the risky nature of 
this investment, firms usually add a suitable risk premium to the discount rate which they 
apply in evaluating the project. Since the focus of this thesis is on political risk, other 
transactions costs treated as are exogenous to the model.  
Risk, in general, is defined as a situation in which the outcome is uncertain, and 
for which a number of possibilities exist, each with its own probability. Economists 
typically define it as a measure of the dispersion of a probability distribution, with a 
greater dispersion indicating a higher risk. Risk for an MNC in the case of FDI arises 
when a multinational company is faced with an investment decision overseas for which a 
number of possible outcomes exist each with its own probability. FDI decisions include 
costs due to political events and various elements of the overseas environment such as 
corruption, excessive bureaucracy etc. Ultimately, the cost of political risk depends on 
the probability of the occurrence of the risk and the severity of the loss.  
Φt = Prob (Occurrence of the event) t * Ψ                                                           (14) 
Where,  
Ψt = Severity of loss at time t 
 
If an event is likely to result in a huge loss and therefore has a high severity but a 
low probability of occurrence then the cost for the international firm is also less. For 
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example: assume it is absolutely certain that a new hostile government will come to 
power in one month and that it will force a firm to divest its assets. In this case the cost of 
political risk is very high.  
The severity of the risk also depends on multiple factors. As a base case, it can be 
argued that severity depends on the dollar value (in the case of US MNCs) of the asses at 
risk combined with the impact of the risky event on the asset. Consider the case of an 
MNC that is in the initial stages of entry into an international location. Clearly the initial 
investment is at a relative minimum and the monetary value of the assets is also low. 
However, since this is a first time entry, the MNC faces a large risk as it is not familiar 
with the operating environment and it can be presumed that the MNC has not yet 
established friendly alliances. Therefore, its is logical to assume that any risk which may 
strike the MNC in this stage will have a heavy impact, and result in a monetary loss that 
is greater than the value of the assets at risk (reputation, intangible assets, loss of morale 
etc). In contrast an MNC that has well established operations in a foreign environment 
and which has learned about the operating environment as well as having formed friendly 
business alliances and strong relationships with local government is comparatively well 
protected against political shocks. So, even though the monetary value of the assets at 
risk may be quite high, the impact of a political shock to the firm is likely to be rather 
low. Hence in this model, severity is defined as: 
Ψt = βt * αt                                                                                         (15) 
Ψt = Severity of loss at time t 
βt= Loss Impact Multiple at time t 
αt = Size of the asset at risk at time t (Which includes the incremental quantity and the 
reinvestment of retained earnings in the foreign plant) 
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 The size of the asset at risk depends on the initial investment and the incremental 
quantity produced in the new location: 
                                                                                ∑=
=
∆+=
nt
t
tt QI
0
0α (16)
Where, 
  tQ∆ = Dollar value of incremental quantity that is produced in the international 
location (depending on the cost differentials, incremental quantity is either produced 
domestically or shifted to the international location) and the reinvestment of retained 
earnings in the new location. 
 I0 = Initial investment in the host country 
 
  
It is also important to understand that the impact of Political Risk on transaction 
cost is not a one time event. Rather, it is a dynamic process which occurs over time. As a 
result, there are some important feedback mechanisms that have to be taken into account 
in studying the impact of political risk.  
Figure 11 shows the feedback mechanisms for an MNC having foreign 
operations. The MNC’s initial move to the foreign location can be explained by 
transaction cost theory. After a few years of operation, the MNC continues to operate in 
the foreign location because of cost advantages. When a political shock hits the MNC, the 
cost of doing business to the firm also increases. This increase in the cost may not be high 
enough to warrant an immediate roll-out, but may significantly affect both levels of 
production and future levels of investment. 
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Figure 11: Overview of Feedback Mechanisms 
 
 
Over time, if the cost of doing business continues to increase, the MNC will have 
to reduce its foreign commitments. A counter-veiling force is the fact that during the time 
the MNC operates in the foreign country, it begins to learn about the operating 
environment. This learning helps in reducing the impact of a loss. For example, a firm 
that accumulates a 30% learning effect would reduce its impact of loss due to political 
risk by 30%. 
)1(* λβθ −= tt      (17) 
 
θ = Loss Impact Multiple After Learning  
β = Loss Impact Multiple  
λ= Rate of Learning 
 
Dynamic Interactions in the Model 
Based on the above explanations, a systems dynamic model was built to explore 
the different scenarios in the impact of political risk on the transaction cost of the firm. 
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Figure 12 shows a dynamic model that captures the impact of political risk on the 
transaction cost of a Multinational Firm engaged in international production.  
The model considers the scenario of a hypothetical MNC in the manufacturing 
sector. The MNC behaves in a manner justified by transaction cost theory. That is, it 
looks for the cheapest location in which to manufacture and the decision to locate 
production in foreign manufacturing centers is entirely cost driven. The total unit cost of 
international production, as explained earlier, is the sum of the unit international 
manufacturing cost and the transaction cost. Political risk is also a part of the transaction 
cost, so when the firm faces a politically risky situation the transaction cost also 
increases. The variable ‘excess demand’ in the model represents the excess demand that 
cannot be satisfied by local production. The MNC serves local demand, which grows at a 
rate determined by the variable ‘Growth of demand’. The final products are sold in the 
local market at a price that also grows at the same rate as the growth of demand. The 
domestic manufacturing cost and the international manufacturing costs also grow at the 
rate set by ‘growth of unit domestic cost’ and ‘growth of international manufacturing 
cost’. If the ‘total unit international cost’ is lower than the ‘total unit domestic cost’, then 
the excess demand is moved to an international location for production.  
If the ‘total unit international cost’ is greater than the ‘total unit domestic cost’, 
then the ‘excess demand’ is produced in the domestic location. The ‘total cost for the 
parent company’ is the sum of the domestic and international costs of production. The 
revenue and costs are computed from the same data as that from which the ‘profit’ to the 
firm is calculated. 
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The ‘size of the asset at risk’ is denoted by the dollar value of the assets that are at 
risk if a political threat strikes. This value in turn depends on the amount of reinvestment 
which occurs due to increased international production. If the initial investment is large, 
then the monetary value of the asset at risk also increases. Over time as more and more 
production moves to the international location, the investment in the international 
location also increases. ‘Severity’ denotes the dollar value of the tangible assets and 
intangible assets at risk. ‘Loss impact multiple’ captures the value of the intangible assets 
as a multiple of the tangible assets. ‘Rate of Learning’ captures in percentage terms the 
amount of learning that the MNC has accumulated over time and this learning helps to 
reduce the ‘Initial Loss Impact’. The final loss impact represents the impact of the loss to 
the firm after factoring in the counterbalancing impact of learning.  
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Figure 12: Impact of Political Risk on Transaction Cost 
Cost of political risk
to the firm
Probability
Severity
Loss Impact
Multiple After
Learning
Size of the
asset at risk
transaction cost
total unit international cost
International
Manufacturing cost
Production
International (qty)
Total Unit
Domestic Cost
Initial Investment in
foreign country
Rate of Learning
Initial Loss
Impact Multiple
reinvestment
Total production
Market Demand
Growth of demand
PriceRevenue
Profit
Total cost for the
parent company
Excess Demand
Growth of unit
domestic cost
Growth of international
manuf cost
Initial Price
Production
domestic (qty)
<Production
domestic (qty)>
<Total Unit
Domestic Cost>
<total unit
international cost>
Other transaction
cost per unit
Incremental qty
Probability Lookup
<Time>
<Production
International (qty)>
<total unit
international cost>
‘Loss Impact’ and the ‘size of asset at risk’ together determine the severity of a political 
risk. Finally, the ‘cost of political risk to the firm’ is computed by taking into account the 
probability of the occurrence of the political risk event. 
Political Risk Ranking 
Different countries have varying levels of political risk depending on the nature of 
the government, the legal environment governing the operations of private businesses, the 
local fiscal and economic policies, the level of corruption and bureaucratic red tape, labor 
and human rights laws, as well as a number of informal social variables. The level of 
each of these variables will vary for each country and accordingly different countries can 
be classified as possessing different degrees of political risk. Many professional agencies 
exist, who rank the world’s countries on a spectrum ranging from high risk to low 
political risk depending on various underlying factors. These different professional 
agencies have been well studied in the literature (Haendel et al., 1975, Howell and 
Chaddick, 1994, The Economist, 1986). In this context, their rakings are a useful way to 
understand the level of risk faced by MNC’s in each country. One important ranking is 
provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The Economist’s index is called the 
political stability risk ranking and is based on aggregate scores related to Social unrest, 
Orderly transfers, Opposition stance, Excessive executive authority, and International 
tensions. The scores are weighted to generate rankings between 0 and 100 with smaller 
numbers indicating lower risk and higher numbers indicating greater risk as shown in 
Figure 41, (for a complete listing of the countries with their respective ranks refer to 
Table 4.) 
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Four sample countries with an increasing order of risk were chosen for the 
purpose of this simulation: Switzerland (Rank: 0), Romania (Rank: 35), Israel (Rank: 50), 
and Pakistan (Rank: 85). If an MNC is operating in all of these countries, then the 
comparative level of risk faced by the MNC in each country would be proportional to the 
country’s incremental risk ranking. For example, if an MNC is operating in the four 
countries mentioned above then, at the time of initial entry or no learning, the MNC 
would face 85% more risk from Pakistan than what they faced in Switzerland. For 
example, Techint (http://www.techintgroup.com/, 2005), a multinational group based in 
Argentina and operating in the steel, oil & gas, and services industry has operations in 
Japan (Rank: 5), Italy (Rank: 20), Brazil (Rank: 25), Romania (Rank: 35), and Argentina 
(Rank: 45). Under the above said assumption, Techint faces increasing levels of risk in 
proportion to the political risk rankings of the countries in which it has operations. Based 
on this assumption the political risk ranking is taken as a proxy for the probability of a 
risk event occurring in the country. The results of the simulations are discussed in the 
following chapter. Three different scenarios have been considered: a) The impact of 
probability on the cost of political risk b) The impact of political risk on the level of 
investment in each country and c) the impact of learning on risk probability and 
investment level. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SCENARIOS AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
This chapter explains the various scenarios studied and the results of simulating 
the model components put forth in chapter three.  
LEARNING SIMULATION 
This section describes the output of the simulation model for the first component 
that is, the learning curve impact of multinationals. Figure 13 presents the simulation 
model described in the previous chapter for reference. In order to illustrate the learning 
curve effect, a numerical example of project valuation was chosen.  (Please refer to the 
Appendices for a complete list of the model constants and time varying parameters). The 
present value of future cash flows is represented by the variable “PV of Cash In Project” 
and this is the variable of interest for the model. During the course of the simulation this 
variable provides the discounted value of all future cash flows in the project. It represents 
the present value of the cash inflows less cash outflows (revenue less expenses) in the 
same manner that the cash flows would be computed in an ordinary NPV analysis. The 
cash flows are discounted using a discount factor (1 + discount rate) and the discount rate 
at each time period is set to decline at a constant rate of “α”, which is set at the 
beginning of every simulation run. As defined earlier, ‘Final Equilibrium Discount Rate’ 
is the final equilibrium value of the discount rate at which point the competitive risk 
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becomes zero and the total risk faced by the firm is equivalent to that of its 
competitors. The discount factor at every time period depends on the discount factor in 
the previous time period as previously explained and this dependency is incorporated in 
the model. 
Figure 13: Impact of Learning curve 
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The discount rate used in the computation of the discount factor also has a time 
dependency (it declines by a fraction each time period) as shown in the model. The 
complete equations for the model are given in Appendix 1. 
Three different scenarios were considered. The first case is the base case scenario 
and it reflects the use of a constant discount rate over the entire 20 year time-period.4 
Under this scenario, the learning, if any, of the company in the time spent in the foreign 
environment is not incorporated in the discount rate and the project may seem 
                                                 
4 The variable “α” is set equal to 0.    
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unattractive compared to the other cases discussed shortly.  The output of the simulation 
is plotted in the graph in Figure 14, where the ‘PV of Cash In Project’ is plotted over 
time.  
Figure 14: Learning curve effects- Simulation Output 
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In the second case a two stage learning process is considered where, it is assumed 
that the learning occurs sequentially. In the first stage, the company has remained in the 
host country for ‘x’ years, justifying the usage of a higher discount rate to reflect 
unfamiliarity with the new, risky environment. During this time it learns about the 
operating environment and as a result of this learning in stage 1, there is a reduction in 
unfamiliarity as it enters stage 2. In stage 2 the competitive risk is reduced, and it remains 
at this new equilibrium level for the duration of the project. The result of the simulation is 
presented in the same graph, which shows that the present value of cash flows is identical 
to the previous case until the end of year 9. From the beginning of year 10, onward, the 
net present value of the cash flows increases. As a result, the project has improved in the 
second case. 
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The third scenario considers the case of continuous learning by the firm since the 
time of initial entry into the foreign environment. This implies a continuous decline in 
competitive risk and hence in the discount rate. However, in practice this decline cannot 
continue forever and eventually the discount rate reaches an equilibrium level, after 
which time the effect of learning on the performance of the firm with respect to political 
risk is minimal. The output of the simulation is again presented in Figure 14. Clearly, it 
can be observed that the net present value of cash flows has improved from year 1 
onwards, and is higher in value than in either of the previous two scenarios. 
 In summary, the simulation shows that the two-stage learning process yields 
higher cash flows (and therefore a higher NPV compared to the base case scenario which 
uses a constant discount rate (the traditionally practiced FDI valuations). A continuous 
learning curve produces higher net present value for cash flows than either the two-stage 
method or the contact discount rate method. Further, the sooner multinationals learn 
about their environment, the higher the value of the NPV will be, thereby making the 
project more attractive. It should also be acknowledged that learning is a complex 
phenomenon and encompasses a variety of organizational and firm level factors. With 
competitive risk declining on the one hand and systematic risk increasing on the other 
hand, it would be interesting to explore the impact of such feedbacks on the value of the 
firm. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that a stage wise strategy can be useful in 
elevating an FDI opportunity in a high risk environment. The two-stage approach was 
designed in order to model the situation whereby a firm could evaluate the initial few 
years’ cash flow at a higher risk premium and then use a reduced discount rate for 
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subsequent years based on the learning capabilities of the firm. However, such a strategy 
also depends largely on the nature of the project, including whether it can be delayed or 
reversed. Previous research on FDI of under condition uncertainty has argued that, “the 
presence of uncertainty increases the value of the option to ‘wait and see’”.  Given high 
uncertainty, the irreversibility of investment will make it more likely that FDI will be 
delayed. However, if the investment is easy to reverse, than FDI is more likely to be 
undertaken (Rivoli and Salorio, 1996). In the case of high uncertainty and an irreversible 
project, a two-step investment strategy might be particularly useful. In this case, the firm 
initially employs a high discount rate because of the unfamiliarity of the surroundings. 
An initial investment can be made while the firm learns about the foreign environment 
and this would give the firm a chance to subsequently reduce the discount rate, leading to 
a higher estimate of the net present value of future cash flows. What may have initially 
appeared as an unattractive investment in the presence of uncertainty may in fact become 
considerably attractive after the learning curve effect. Following this argument, a real 
options strategy for FDI might prove to be the ideal mechanism whereby an initial 
investment could be made as a first step in evaluating the environment (Copeland and 
Antikarov, 2001; Copeland and Tufano, 2004). After learning about the project by 
spending time in the new foreign environment, a suitable adjustment can be made to the 
discount rate which will allow the project to be valued at a more promising level and then 
the firm can proceed with subsequent rounds of investments as appropriate. In the case of 
reversible projects, if after the first stage of investment, the environment is still hostile, 
then the investment can be withdrawn and losses can be minimized.  
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When considering the timing of an FDI investment, the simulation shows that the 
sooner the firm enters the market and learns about the environment, the higher the value 
of the project will be in comparison  to learning slowly later on in the project. Again, this 
result also depends on the capability of the organization to adapt to its surrounding 
quickly. When the risk of the target country is not perceived to be much higher than the 
risks of the home country then the initial risk premium employed by firms should not be 
very high. This feature of low country or political risk implies that the discount rate 
reduction in the learning curve in these cases is not substantial. In the case of firms 
contemplating an investment in a high-risk host country, the initial risk premium and the 
reduction in the competitive risk is substantial and a stage-wise strategy is likely prove  
useful.  
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION LOCATION SIMULATIONS 
This section describes the output of the simulation model of the second 
component, that is, the choice of production location for multinationals. Figure 15 
presents the simulation model described in the previous chapter.  
Three scenarios were considered. In the first case, a multinational firm decided to 
expand into a foreign location (country B), based on transaction costs and the rate of 
change of the domestic and international cost escalation rates. The MNC shut down the 
operations of their domestic plant and shifted production to the international location 
upon finding a cost advantage in the new location. The second case built upon the first 
case and simulated the scenario where the firm, instead of shutting down its domestic 
operations entirely, continued to operate the domestic plant at full capacity, but moved 
their incremental capacity to the international location. In this case, the foreign country is 
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assumed to have unlimited resources. This strategy proved to be more profitable than that 
employed by the firm in the first case. 
Figure 15: Choice of International Production Locations 
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In the third case, a resource constraint was placed on country B and the firm 
considered the possibility of producing in a third country (Country C) which offered 
better cost advantages than the second country after some particular point in time. When 
this scenario was modeled, the profitability of the firm did not change much, however, it 
proved to be a better result than the base case scenario. (Figure 16) 
The final price of the product and the market demand were set to grow at a steady 
rate of 5%. The total revenue was then calculated, from which the profit (Revenue minus 
the Cost) was also computed. In the simulation, it was expected that there would be a 
shift from domestic to international production depending on the total production cost for 
these two locations.  For the initial conditions the domestic rate of cost increase was set at 
6% and the international rate was set at 5%. Further, it was also expected that the 
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production decision would be sensitive to the rate of domestic and international cost 
escalation rates, transaction costs, and the initial production cost in both domestic and the 
international locations.   
Figure 16: Quantities of production (base case) 
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The model simulated 20 years of production and the quantities of production in both 
the domestic and international locations have been plotted on the same graph as shown in 
Figure 16. It can be seen that until year 16, domestic production is increasing and after 
year 16 there is a sharp fall in the level of domestic production until it reaches the value 
0. At this time international production picks up (from year 16 onwards) and continues to 
increase until year 20. The production cost structure is the underlying mechanism which 
explains this observed production pattern. 
Figure 17 plots the cost of domestic and international production versus time. It 
can be seen that until year 16, domestic production cost is increasing but remains well 
below the cost of international production. Further, the rate of increase for international 
cost is less than the rate of increase for domestic cost. Hence, it takes some time for the 
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two costs to equilibrate. When equilibrium is reached in year 16, domestic cost rises 
above the international cost. Therefore production shifts to the international location after 
year 16.  
Figure 17: Costs of production (base case) 
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The profit of the MNC reflects the same situation. It increases at a steady rate 
until year 16 and increases at a faster rate thereafter. Consequently there is an 
improvement in the firm’s profitability once the MNC shifts its operations overseas. 
Case 2: Simultaneous domestic and international production operations 
The base case scenario assumed that the local plant would be shut down and that 
production would be moved to an international location. However, in reality companies 
tend to operate simultaneously in both domestic and the international locations. In the 
second case it was assumed that country B is an attractive location and there are no 
resource scarcities in this country. This could be exemplified by a production move to 
China. As one economist in BCG pointed out, “…a latest report by the Boston 
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Consulting Group (BCG) made it clear that the cost advantage in some low-cost 
countries including China will remain or even expand. Their advantage will not 
disappear despite raised labor costs due to needs in these countries and their 
modernization process.”(People's Daily Online, September 07, 2004)  
Figure 18: Domestic and International production quantities (case 2) 
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In case 2 it was hypothesized that instead of shutting down the old plant, the firm 
now shifts the excess demand to the international location. In order to model this process, 
a variable called “Incremental Quantity” was introduced, and it refers to the excess 
demand over and above what is already being serviced by the multinational firm.  
Incremental Quantity = Production - (production domestic (qty) + production 
international (qty)) 
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Figure 19: Costs of production (case 2) 
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Figure 18 shows the graph of domestic and international production quantities for the 
MNC over the simulation period.  Domestic production increases rapidly from time 0 and 
eventually levels off at time 17. Correspondingly the international production quantity 
which remained at 0 until time 17 then increases from year 17 onwards. Figure 19 shows 
the cost of domestic and international production operations. Domestic production cost is 
increasing; however, it remains well below international production costs. Under these 
circumstances, the MNC will choose to produce everything domestically. However after 
year 17, domestic production cost exceeds the international cost and from this point 
onwards, international production begins. Unlike the first case the domestic production at 
this stage does not become zero and instead simply flattens out. That is, the MNC on 
realizing a cost advantage internationally decides to expand its operations while 
simultaneously operating domestically at full capacity. The profitability of the MNC was 
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also observed over the course of the simulation. The strategy employed in case 2 largely 
outperformed that of the base case. 
Case 3: Introduction of the Scarcity factor 
The next scenario, case 3 extends case 2 and takes into account the fact that a 
country may not always have an abundance of resources.  A recent Business Week 
reported that US Multinationals who once found Western Europe a promising location 
have begun to scale down their operations in recent years (Business Week 2005). In this 
scenario, cost advantages begin to disappear with the continual usage of resources. As a 
result costs begin to equalize with those of the home country and production eventually 
shifts back to the home country.  
Figure 20: Production quantities 
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India, for example, initially was a competitive location in terms of cost of labor 
for the IT services industry. However, over a period of time, rising wages in India opened 
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the door for other developing countries to become more cost competitive in this field. A 
classic example here is the case of Siemens AG, and their experience with the Net 
Manager project. Siemens initially considered Bangalore, India as the location for 
starting their project, primarily because of cost advantages. However, after factoring in 
other costs such as information transfer, management costs, and job training, they found 
that several Eastern European countries appeared to be more cost effective than 
Bangalore (Thomke and Nimgade, 2001). This type of case is next modeled in the 
simulation, and it is assumed that under these circumstances the international country has 
limited resources. As a result, over time, the cost advantage of the international location 
begins to shrink and eventually it becomes unattractive in comparison to domestic price 
levels, at which point production is expected to shift back to the domestic location.  
Figure 20 graphs the quantities of domestic and international production over 30 
years of simulating this scenario. Domestic production increases slowly up to year 12. 
After year 12, it remains flat and international production which was at 0 begins to 
increase. However, while production is increasing internationally, the international 
resources are being gradually used up and costs begin to escalate. As a result, from year 
25 onwards domestic production again picks up while international production remains 
flat.  
Figure 21 shows the cost curve. As expected, domestic cost is below international 
cost until year 12. From year 12 to year 25 international cost is lower. As resources are 
used up international costs escalate and they overshoot domestic costs after year 25. As 
before the profitability of the MNC is also calculated. The profitability of case 3 is 
largely similar to that of case 2.  
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Case 4: Introduction of Third Country 
In this case, the above model has been expanded to incorporate a third country, 
called country C that provides a greater cost advantage over country B after a certain 
time. For example, US multinationals initially expanded into Western Europe. However, 
in recent years, owing in part to a lack of resources, these companies have shifted parts of 
their operations to Eastern and Central Europe. Another example is the Japan. In several 
Japanese firms, particularly those engaged in the production of consumer electronics 
shifted production in the 1990’s in order to take advantage of low costs in the Philippines. 
However, after a relatively short period of time and owing in part to the shortage of 
resources, these firms then shifted production to China which seemed to be a better 
market in comparison with Philippines. 
Figure 21: Cost Structure 
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According to Yoshima Hayashi, Member of the House of Councilors in Japan, 
most Japanese companies are shifting their production location from the Philippines to 
China as they are more concerned about labor costs, or other factor costs than the power 
cost5.  
 In this model for case 4, the marginal cost of production which is the incremental 
cost of the next unit of production, is computed. This marginal cost of production is then 
compared between the domestic, and the other international locations. The company 
chooses to locate its production to the country where the marginal cost of production is 
lowest. Country C is similar to country B in that there are scarce resources. So, the cost 
advantages in country C will also be exhausted after some period of time. In the 
simulation it is expected that production will start domestically and then move to country 
B. At a certain time, the production costs in country B escalates and country B is 
eventually no longer attractive. At that point, the company looks for a cheaper alternative, 
and as country C now appears attractive, the production location is shifted there. This 
model is simulated for 30 years.  
Figure 22 shows the quantities of production over 30 years in the domestic and 
international (Country B & Country C) locations. As explained earlier, domestic 
production continues to rise until year 11. After that it begins to flatten out because the 
cost of domestic production is not attractive in comparison to country B. At this point, the 
firm moves their marginal production to country B and so the quantity in country B 
                                                 
5 “In Japan, which has a higher power cost than the Philippines, most companies in our country 
are relocating to China because of the high labor cost in Japan. I believe high labor cost is also the reason 
why some Japanese companies in the Philippines relocated (their manufacturing plants) to China,” he told 
a press conference for the 5th Asian Statesmen’s Forum at the Plantation Bay Resort and Spa Tuesday 
(Techno-economic et al.). 
 
75 
begins to increase from year 12 to year 25 before flattening out. After year 25, country B 
also begins to exhaust its resources and their cost advantage begins to disappear in 
comparison to country C.  After year 25, country C’s production picks up and continues 
to increase until the end of the simulation. 
Figure 22: Production Quantities 
Production Quantities
6,000
4,500
3,000
1,500
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Time (Year)
Qty of domestic production million
Qty of production in ocuntry B million
Total Production million
Qty of production in country C million
 
 
In figure 23 the cost curves are examined in order to explain these shifts in 
production. Initially country B & Country C are expensive locations in which to produce. 
Hence, production stays domestic until year 11. From year 11 onwards Country B’s cost 
of production appears to be cheaper than that of country C. Country B also has a cost 
advantage with respect to domestic production until year 25. Between year 11 and year 
25, production in country B begins and then reaches its maximum. Beyond this point, 
country B is at a cost disadvantage. From year 25 onwards the cost in country C is lesser 
than the cost in either country A or country B until the end of the simulation. Thus, 
production shifts to country C. Figure 24 traces the minimum cost at all times. The 
76 
envelope curve is shown here by the thicker line. Production starts domestically, moves 
to country B after year 11 and then to country C after time 25. 
 
Figure 23: Cost of production 
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Figure 24: Minimum cost of production 
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POLITICAL RISK SIMULATIONS 
The last section of this chapter describes the simulation output of the third 
component of the model, which is the impact of political risk on the MNC. Figure 25 
shows the systems dynamics model for this component. 
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Figure 25: Impact of Political Risk on MNC 
Cost of political risk
to the firm
Probability
Severity
Loss Impact
Multiple After
Learning
Size of the
asset at risk
transaction cost
total unit international cost
International
Manufacturing cost
Production
International
(qty)
Total Unit
Domestic Cost
Initial Investment in
foreign country
Rate of Learning
Initial Loss
Impact Multiple
reinvestment
Total production
Market Demand Growth of demand
Price
Revenue
Profit
Total cost for the
parent company
Excess Demand
Growth of unit
domestic cost
Growth of international
manuf cost
Initial Price
Production
domestic (qty)
<Production
domestic (qty)>
<Total Unit
Domestic Cost>
<total unit
international cost>
Other transaction
cost per unit
Incremental qty
<Production
International (qty)>
<total unit
international cost>
 
 
Four countries were chosen for this simulation. The countries are, in increasing order 
of political risk, Switzerland, Romania, Israel, and Pakistan. Three sets of simulations 
were run using the model described above. The first set of simulations tests the sensitivity 
of the cost of political risk to changes in the probability of political risk.  The second set 
of simulations explores the impact of political risk on the level of investment received by 
the country. The third set of simulations focuses on the impact of learning on the level of 
risk for the MNC. Each simulation was run for a period of 100 months. 
i) The sensitivity of the cost of political risk to probability 
As explained earlier an MNC operating in the domestic environment is 
considering expanding its production location to an alternative location with the aim of 
minimizing its production cost. Country B is an alternative for the MNC which has a 
lower production cost than country A but a higher level of political risk. Different 
simulation runs are analyzed for various levels of political risk in country B. That is, 
difference scenarios are considered depending on whether country B is Switzerland (Risk 
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prob: 0), Romania (Risk prob: 35), Israel (Risk prob: 50), or Pakistan (Risk prob: 85). In 
each case, the impact of probability on the cost of political risk is observed over time. 
Figure 26 shows the results of these simulations. The cost of political risk for operating in 
Switzerland is zero because the probability of political instability is zero6. Therefore, 
Switzerland is seen as a stable country by an MNC and the cost of political risk as plotted 
over time stays steady at level 0. 
Figure 26: Comparative Cost of Political Risk  
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Figure 26 also shows the cost of political risk for an MNC operating in Romania 
(35% political risk probability), which has a higher level of political risk than 
Switzerland. The comparative cost of operating in Romania is substantially higher than 
operating in Switzerland. It can be seen that the maximum cost of political risk for 
operating in Romania is around 150,000 monetary units during the 100 months of the 
simulation. 
                                                 
6 The last Swiss expropriation of foreign assets took place in the 14th Century. 
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The cost of political risk for an MNC operating in Israel is also shown in the same 
graph. Israel has a higher political risk probability (50%) than either of the two foreign 
countries. The maximum cost of political risk for operating in Israel during the 100 
months of the simulation is considerably higher (around 200,000) than that of Romania. 
The cost of political risk for operating in Pakistan (risk probability of 85%), the 
country with the highest political risk in the sample is also plotted. Clearly the cost of 
operating in Pakistan is the highest with a value of 300,000 monetary units. This is 
substantially more than that all of the above cases combined. 
From the above simulations it can be inferred that the model performs as 
expected. That is, the cost of political risk for operating in a country increases with the 
probability of political risk in that country. The maximum cost due to political risk 
incurred in a country will be proportional to the political risk probability in that country. 
MNCs desiring to keep their political risk costs at a minimum tend to choose those 
countries where the probability of occurrence of an adverse political event is low. 
The model is useful for examining a number of alternative scenarios for an MNC 
manager. To illustrate the robustness of the model, a simple variation has been 
introduced. For instance, in all of the above simulations, the probability of political risk is 
assumed to be constant over time. This assumption can be modified to reflect a time 
varying risk which better reflects real life conditions. The impact of a time varying risk 
on the cost of operating can easily be observed in the simulation. Let us consider that 
country B is Israel and that an MNC’s senior management believes that political risk in 
Israel is not a steady value but shifts away from a steady value over time. Specifically, 
political risk initially increases for 35 months due to heightened political activity, and 
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then begins to decline after 40 months. Figure 27 shows a graph of this varying 
probability over time. 
Figure 27: Varying Probability 
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The simulation of time-varying political risk in Israel has costs which vary over 
time as expected, which is shown in Figure 28. The base case of a steady probability of 
political risk is also illustrated in the graph for comparison. Compared to the base case, 
the varying probability creates a greater variation in the cost structure and can have direct 
implications for the firm’s profitability. This kind of model provides a priori knowledge 
about the varying cost structure for the MNC in the host country. It is a value addition 
insofar as it helps to avoid surprises and would place management in a better position to 
deal with political risk. In the example under discussion, Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics for the cost of political risk with time varying probability. On average, the cost 
of political risk has increased by 41.9% from the base case. The maximum deviation is of 
94.2% from the base case and occurred at time 32.  The minimum deviation from the 
base case is 2.2% and occurred at time 1. The standard deviation is 33%. 
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Figure 28: Cost of operating in Israel with varying probability of risk 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of cost of operating in Israel (Time-varying probability) 
Cost of political risk in Israel with varying probability 
  
Mean 41.9%
Median 36.3%
Standard Deviation 33.0%
Sample Variance 10.9%
Minimum 2.2%
Maximum 94.2%
 
Sensitivity of level of investment in the country to political risk 
The second set of simulations was performed to analyze the sensitivity of the 
level of investment in a host country to the level of political risk in the country. That is, if 
a country is seen as more risky then what is the level of investment that is received by the 
country as compared to a country that is seen as a more stable one. A priori, it is expected 
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that the level of investment would increase with decreasing political risk and also the 
investment would increase at a much earlier time period in the stable country. 
Figure 29: Impact of Probability on level of investment in host country 
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Figure 29 shows the growth of the asset at risk for an investment in the host 
country over a simulation period of 100 months.  Since the political risk of Switzerland is 
very low, the MNCs have an uninterrupted investment pattern starting at time 20. The 
maximum level of investment in Switzerland is around 60,000 monetary units. Compared 
to the investment level of Switzerland, the maximum level of investment received by 
Romania (risk prob: 35) is considerably less. Romania’s maximum level of investment is 
around 44,000 monetary units and the investment begins to pick up only at time 70. Israel 
is much more risky than Romania, and again receives further less investment (40,000 
monetary units). The investment in Israel begins to accelerate only in year 75, which is 
much later than either of the above two cases. Figure 29 also plots the level of investment 
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in Pakistan. Compared to the investment level of Switzerland, the maximum level of 
investment in Pakistan is very low at 36,000 monetary units. Further Pakistan’s 
investment begins to increase only at time 77, which is much later than all of the previous 
cases. 
From the above simulations, it can be concluded MNCs tend to increase the level of 
investment in a foreign country at a much earlier time period in a less risky country and 
that MNCs are willing to wait and invest later when dealing with a volatile environment. 
ii) Impact of Learning 
 The above simulations have shown the impact of political risk on the level of 
investment and the impact of risk probability on the cost of political risk to a firm. An 
opposing force exits that can help to minimize or lessen the impact of political risk. This 
effect is the impact of learning by MNCs that helps to reduce the impact of risk 
probability and also increases the level of investment. The following set of simulations 
shows these impacts. 
Figure 30 shows the impact of learning on the cost of political risk for an MNC 
operating in Romania. Two cases of learning are plotted in figure 30. The dotted line 
shows the cost of political risk with a 20% learning rate and the continuous line 
represents the cost of political risk with an 80% learning rate. Clearly, with increased 
learning, the cost of political risk of operating in Romania declines with an increased rate 
of learning.  
 
85 
Figure 30: Impact of learning on the cost of political risk of operating in Romania  
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Figure 31: Impact of learning on the level of investment in Pakistan 
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Figure 31 shows the impact of learning on the level of investment in the most 
risky country in the sample, Pakistan. As before, two learning rates are plotted on the 
86 
same graph. The dotted line shows the impact at a learning rate of 20% and the 
continuous line shows the level of investment over time at a learning rate of 80%. The 
higher rate of learning provides an increased level of investment at a much earlier time 
period does than the 20% learning rate. 
The impact of political risk can be treated as a cost of doing business globally and 
this cost adds to the overall transaction cost. The loss for the firm due to political risk 
depends on the probability of occurrence of the event and the severity of the event. 
Severity again depends upon the size of the asset at risk and the loss impact multiple. 
When MNCs make an investment it is not only the immediate investment that is at risk 
but there are also other factors, such as reputation, goodwill, morale, and other 
intangibles assets. The actual monetary loss rising from political risk can be much more 
than the physical investment. This effect is captured in the loss impact multiple. The 
other balancing force that helps to neutralize the impact of political risk is the impact of 
learning. As firms spend more time and allocate more resources to form friendly business 
alliances with local groups and governments, they become more adept at doing business 
in the local environment and can gain a competitive advantage. This helps them to better 
handle political risk. Given a rate of learning and a loss impact multiple, it has been 
found in simulation that a) the cost of political risk to a firm increases with the increasing 
probability of risk and b) countries with a high probability of risk do not retain a high 
level of investment from MNCs. Countries with a low probability of political risk retain a 
high level of investment and also receive this investment in a much earlier time period. 
Further, the rate of learning by MNCs presents an added dimension in the sense that the 
impact of political risk on costs can be reduced and also the level of investment can be 
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increased with increased learning. With appropriate leaning behaviors, MNCs can choose 
to move their production to risky locations and aim to increase their rate of learning to 
decrease their operating costs. 
INTEGRATION OF THE THREE COMPONENTS 
The models discussed so far in this thesis examined the impact of learning, the 
choice of production location decision, and the impact of political risk in isolation. The 
simultaneous impact of all the three components is discussed in this section. This 
integrated model gives a holistic perspective to the study of the impact of political risk on 
an MNC’s choice of manufacturing location in the presence of political risk and learning.  
Various interactions can be observed in the integrated model. A brief description 
of the integrated model is given below followed by a discussion of the simulation results. 
Figure 32 shows the complete model with all of the components integrated into a single 
model. Here an MNC that is operating in a home country is considered. As discussed 
previously, this MNC operates in the manufacturing sector and serves local demand. The 
MNC seeks to optimize its production costs by seeking an alternative location to which 
they can shift all or part of their manufacturing. 
The excess demand is shifted to the international location if the total international 
cost of manufacturing (including transaction cost) is less than the total cost of domestic 
production. Country B and Country C are the alternatives available for the MNC. 
Country B although attractive, has a constraint that the available resources are small and 
therefore scarcity of resources will set in following continued operations. Further, 
country B is seen as a politically risky country. The cost of operating in country B 
therefore increases after some point in time because of political risk. The monetary loss 
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for the MNC due to political risk arises from damage to both tangible and intangible 
assets in the country.  
 
90 
Figure 32: Integrated Model 
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Political risk is modeled as a part of the transaction costs for doing business in country B. 
As the quantity of production increases in country B, the amount of assets at risk due to 
political risk increases, and this increases the cost of doing business. The learning curve 
module is also integrated and accounts for some reduction in risk as a result of learning in 
the foreign operating environment. Different levels of learning are explored in the 
simulation. Firm learning helps to reduce the cost of doing business and also reduces the 
excess risk discount premium that is charged when analyzing overseas project returns.  
The simulation model is designed to select the cheapest manufacturing location 
for the MNC, taking into consideration the impact of political risk and the impact of 
learning. In order to understand the interaction effects of learning and political risk on the 
MNC four different scenarios were considered, varying the level of risk of the host 
country and the rate of learning of the MNC (Table 2). In the following cases, Pakistan 
with a risk level of 80% is considered as a country with high political risk and Romania 
with 30% risk is considered as a politically low risk country. An 80% learning rate by the 
MNC is considered as a high learning rate and a 30% learning rate is considered as a low 
learning rate.  
Table 2: Framework for analyzing the impact of risk and learning 
Learning 
  Low High 
Lo
w
 
Case 1 Case 3 
R
is
k 
H
ig
h 
Case 2 Case 4 
 
Case 1 represents the scenario of an MNC with a low level of learning (around 30%) 
considering expansion into a low risk country such as Romania (30% risk). Case 2 
considers the same MNC with low level of learning (30%) expanding into a high risk 
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area such as Pakistan (80%). Case 3 considers an MNC with high levels of learning 
(80%) considering expansion into a low risk country, Romania (30%) and case 4 
represents an MNC with high capacity for learning (80%) considering operating in a high 
risk country, Pakistan. In each of the above cases, the cost of political risk for operating 
in the country and the level of investment received by each country is observed.  
Combined impact on the cost of political risk of operating in host country 
It can be seen that the best case scenario is case 3 where a high learning MNC 
invests in low risk environment. This is consistent with a priori expectations. Similarly, 
the worst case scenario where the MNC’s cost is highest is case 2 where a slow learning 
MNC is operating in a high risk environment. It can be inferred that an MNC could keep 
its operating costs at a minimum by choosing to invest in a low risk country. However, 
the firm does not gain much if the rate of learning is slow. Also, comparative cost 
advantages may not be as readily available in developed low-cost environments. Hence, 
in the choice of location selection, it is not enough to analyze only the risky nature of the 
environment but one has to also pay attention to the learning capabilities of the MNC. 
From an MNC’s perspective, substantial efforts need to be directed towards monitoring 
and improving organizational learning. 
Figure 34 shows the graph of the cost of political risk for the MNC in all four 
cases. As shown before, the cost of political risk for operating in a host country declines 
with an increased learning (comparing case 1 with case 3 and case 2 with case 4).  Also, 
given the same level of learning, the maximum cost of operating in a country increases 
with an increased level of risk (comparing case 1 with case 2 and case 3 with case 4).  It 
is expected that the best scenario, that is a scenario where the cost of political risk of 
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operating in a host country is minimum, would be the case of a high learning MNC 
operating in a low risk environment.  
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Figure 33: Combined impact of learning and political risk on cost 
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Figure 34: Combined impact on the level of investment in the host country 
Cost of political risk - All cases
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Combined impact on the level of investment in the host country 
The combined impact of learning and political risk on the level of investment in 
the host country is analyzed next.  Figure 36 shows the graph of the level of investment in 
each of the above cases. Figure 37 graphs the level of investment of all the cases in a 
single graph. As the risk level increases, the time at which the host country receives 
investment also increases. From table 3 we can see that in case 1 the level of investment 
begins to increase at month 32 whereas in case 2 (which is more risky) the level of 
investment only begins to increase at time 69.  Similarly, when comparing case 3 and 
case 4, case 3 receives investment at time 19, whereas case 4 receives investment only in 
time 26.  
Table 3: Timing and Size of investment 
 Variable CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4 
Timing of Investments 32 69 19 26 
Size of the Asset 3116 14096 2101 2567 
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 An interesting data point is the maximum level of investment received by the host 
country in each case. Although the investment in risky countries is delayed, these 
countries get a higher level of investment than the less risky countries presumably due to 
the kind of cost advantages discussed previously. For example, comparing case 1 and 2, 
the maximum level of investment received by the host country in case 2 is higher than the 
maximum level of investment received in case 1. Similarly, the maximum level of 
investment received by the host country in case 4 is more than the maximum level of 
investment received by the host country in case 3.  
Figure 35: Size of the MNC over time 
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Figure 35 shows the economies of scale effect. That is, when an MNCs operations 
are small, it makes economic sense to invest in a low risk country. However, when the 
host country is more risky, shifting to an international location makes economic sense 
only when the size of the MNC is large. 
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The total number of quantities produced by the MNC, which is an indicator of the 
size of the MNC over time, is shown in Figure 35. In case 2, the MNC’s level of 
investment in the host country picks up at time 69. At this time the size of the MNC is 
around 30,000 units. However, in case 3, the MNC entered into the host country at time 
19 but the size of the MNC was only 1400 units. Therefore when the host country is 
risky, MNCs can invest only at a later time when they have grown in size. The size of the 
MNC gives a scale advantage for investments in high risk countries which cannot be 
exploited by smaller companies.  
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Figure 36: Combined impact on the level of investment in the host country 
Figure 37: Combined impact on the level of investment 
Level of investment - All cases
40 M
30 M
20 M
10 M
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
Time (Month)
Case 1: Level of investment
Case 2: Level of investment
Case 3: Level of investment
Case 4: Level of investment
 
Figure 38: Time varying rate of learning 
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Figure 39: Impact of variable learning on cost of political risk 
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Figure 40: Impact of variable learning on the level of investment 
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The impact of a variable learning rate 
The above simulations were based on a steady learning rate for the MNC. A slight 
modification is introduced by employing a variable learning curve and the combined 
impact of learning and political risk are observed on the process of location selection. For 
this simulation, Israel was chosen as the host country. The rate of learning was assumed 
to increase over time up to a certain point (time 30) after which time the learning rate 
decreases (from time 45 onwards) and reaches a steady state. Figure 38 shows the 
graphical representation of a varying learning rate over time compared with the base case 
of steady learning.  
The impact of varying the learning rate on the cost of political risk in country B 
and the level of investment received by country B are observed over time. Figure 39 
shows the impact of varying learning rate on the cost of political risk and Figure 40 
shows the impact on the level of investment in country B along with the respective base 
cases. With a variable learning rate, the cost of political risk in country B increases over 
time from time 45 (this is the time when the learning rate begins to decline) onwards and 
after time 85 country B becomes unattractive and investment shifts to country C.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
With the increasing complexity of the FDI process, managers need more 
sophisticated tools to analyze investment decisions. Traditional management techniques, 
concepts, and tools cannot sufficiently respond to the increased expectations of business, 
financial and policy organizations, which have to deal with complex decisions and time 
and cost constrained projects. Earlier studies in the area of foreign direct investment have 
analyzed FDI decision making from fundamental perspectives such as risk, cost, and 
quality. However, they have all dealt with the problem of FDI investment in a linear 
fashion, and have studied the impact of the various decisional factors in isolation. With 
an increase in both the size and complexity of FDI projects, the number of stakeholders 
has increased and there is a concomitant need for a broader common language to foster 
communication.  A higher level framework which can still be of practical use for 
managers is thus needed to understand and explain the dynamics behind the FDI process. 
The goal of this thesis was to build a practical tool for the managers of MNCs 
which could enable them to foresee the impact of their policy decisions in a holistic 
perspective. The tool is designed to allow managers to model the world in a risk free 
environment. While this cannot be a substitute for real world experience, it nevertheless 
adds value to the decision making process. A simple problem was chosen, where an 
MNC was engaged in manufacturing and was on the lookout for alternative locations, 
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which could serve their excess demand in local markets. A simple model of two countries 
was chosen, resource constraints were established, and a simulation model was built that 
would allow a domestic company to choose the production location which was the most 
cost effective at any given point in time. Clearly, the decision of selecting a production 
location involves the interaction of more factors than manufacturing cost alone. This 
thesis was limited to exploring the impact of learning and the impact of political risk on 
the location decision.  
The key findings of the thesis follow. First, the cost of political risk for operating 
in a host country increases with an increasing probability of political risk. A country with 
high political risk receives investment at a much later stage than a country with lower 
political risk. Therefore from a country perspective, policy decisions aimed at reducing 
the cost of political risk (treated as a part of transaction cost) would help those countries 
to receive FDI at an earlier stage in the investment process and in their development 
process. These countries need to focus on institution building and reduce the overall 
transaction cost for MNCs in order to attract high levels of FDI. The second finding 
concerns the impact of learning on political risk. Learning helps to reduce the cost of 
political risk of operating in a host country. Also, when learning is increased, MNCs can 
begin their international expansion at an earlier time period compared to MNCs with 
lower levels of learning. Therefore when faced with alternative choices for manufacturing 
location MNCs cannot decide solely on the level of risk of the host country. That is if 
country A is less risky than country B then an MNC deciding to go to country A does not 
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guarantee a lower operating cost over time (which has a direct bearing on the 
profitability of the firm). It was shown via simulation that a fast learning MNC achieves 
lower operating costs than a slow learning MNC, irrespective of the risk level of the host 
country. In this case, it was shown that the choice of location does not rest solely on the 
risk level of the target country. Under conditions of increased levels of learning, MNCs 
can still gain by moving to high risk locations. Hence an important factor for determining 
the success (i.e., lower operating costs) of the operation is the rate at which the MNC can 
learn and adapt itself to the foreign environment. As a result monitoring an MNCs 
learning ability is crucial and must form an integral part of their strategy. More 
sophisticated tools have to be developed to capture the dynamics of organizational 
learning. Monitoring can occur by developing metrics through techniques such as the 
Balanced Scorecard to measure learning at every level of the organization along a variety 
of different dimensions. For example, cultural learning, learning to manage the time 
necessary to get through the local bureaucracy to sanction a contract, or the rate of 
increase in the number of local employees are some typical measures of organizational 
learning. When monitored over time, an MNC can increase its learning rate throughout 
the organization. Because of this, when considering foreign direct investment decisions, it 
pays for the organization to invest up front to learn about its foreign environment. This up 
front investment can greatly reduce the cost of doing business in an international location 
over time. The last finding of the thesis is that although risky countries receive delayed 
investments, the magnitude of investment is substantially higher than in the low risk 
countries. This finding implies that when a cheaper alternative is found but the level of 
risk is high, smaller MNCs cannot readily take advantage of the cost difference because 
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of their small size. It would make economic sense for smaller MNCs to invest in low risk 
countries. Only MNCs with large capitalization can take advantage of the low cost 
resources in a high risk host country. As a result, it does not make economic sense for 
smaller MNCs to invest in high risk areas. The development of the simulation model 
incorporating feedback mechanisms is a novel methodological contribution of this thesis. 
The simulation model developed here allows the user to change their assumptions (such 
as the growth rate of cost, the level of political risk, the rate or shape of the learning 
curve) and observe the impact of these changes on location choice. A firm specific 
analysis can be undertaken using this model. Hence, it is a practical as well as a 
theoretical tool for managers which can significantly improve FDI decision making.  
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APPENDIX 
a. LEARNING CURVE - MODEL PARAMETERS 
Model Variables Model Constants
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Symbols used in the model and explanation  
Symbol Variable Symbol Variable
1+tR   Discount rate α  Rate of Learning  
tDF  Discount Factor eqR  Equilibrium discount rate 
tCIP  Cash in project Ro  Initial discount rate 
C  Cost 0σ  Growth rate of sales 
outfC  Cash outflow D  Demand 
τ  Tax expense P  Sales Price 
ρ  Revenue   
infC  Cash inflow   
S  Total Sales   
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b. CHOICE OF PRODUCTION LOCATION – MODEL 
PARAMETERS 
Model Variables  Model 
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Symbols used in the model and explanation  
Symbol Variable Symbol Variable
tdomQ ,  Quantity of domestic 
production 
)( BQδ  Incremental quantity produced 
in country B 
)(Qδ  Total incremental quantity Dυ  Growth of demand 
tBQ , ,  tCQ , Quantity of production in 
country B and country C 
tB ,χ  Scarcity factor 
Aς , Bς , Cς  Growth of cost in country A, 
B, and C 
tP  Price 
Bµ , Cµ  Marginal cost for the parent 
company with respect to cost 
in country B, and country C 
TP  Total Production 
AU , ,  BU CU Unit production cost in 
country A, B, and C 
C  Total Cost for parent company 
Aυ , Bυ , cυ  Transaction cost in country B 
and C 
  
π  Profit   
MD  Market Demand   ρ  Revenue   
BTU ,  CTU Total Unit cost of production 
in country B, and country C. 
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c. IMPACT OF POLITICAL RISK ON MNC – MODEL 
PARAMETERS 
 
Model Variables Model Constants
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Symbols used in the model and explanation  
Symbol Variable 
Τ Transaction cost 
Φ Cost of Political Risk to the firm 
Ε Other Transaction costs. 
Ψ Severity 
Β Loss Impact Multiple 
P Probability 
Α Size of the asset at risk 
Θ Loss Impact Multiple After Learning 
I0 Initial Investment 
Qint Quantity produced internationally 
intMC  International Manufacturing cost 
domTU  Total unit domestic cost of manufacturing 
intTU  Total unit international cost of manufacturing 
RI Reinvestment 
tQδ  Incremental quantity 
tDδ  Excess demand 
Dυ  Growth of demand 
Λ Rate of Learning 
TP Total Production 
Pr Price 
ρ  Revenue 
D  Demand 
intς , domς  Growth of international and domestic manufacturing costs 
C Total cost for the parent company 
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d. POLITICAL RISK RANKING 
Figure 41: Political Risk Rating 
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Source: EIU Views Wire 
Table 4: Political Stability Risk Ranking:  
The rakings are based on aggregate scores related to Social unrest, Orderly transfers, 
Opposition stance, Excessive executive authority, and International tensions. The scores 
are weighted to generate rankings between 0 and 100 with smaller numbers indicating 
lower risk and higher numbers indicating higher risk 
 
Source: EIU Views Wire 
# Country Rank  # Country Rank 
1 Pakistan 85  40 Croatia 45
2 Azerbaijan 80  41 Hong Kong 45
3 Iran 80  42 Indonesia 45
4 Ecuador 75  43 Panama 45
5 Egypt 75  44 Qatar 45
6 Kyrgyz Republic 75  45 Sri Lanka 45
7 Ukraine 75  46 Thailand 45
8 Uzbekistan 75  47 Turkey 45
9 Bahrain 70  48 UAE 45
10 Bolivia 70  49 South Africa 40
11 Nigeria 70  50 Tanzania 40
12 Swaziland 70  51 India 35
13 China 65  52 Mexico 35
14 Ethiopia 65  53 Romania 35
15 Kenya 65  54 South Korea 35
16 Morocco 65  55 Taiwan 35
17 Peru 65  56 Uruguay 35
18 Venezuela 65  57 El Salvador 30
19 Zimbabwe 65  58 Poland 30
20 Algeria 60  59 Brazil 25
21 Equatorial Guinea 60  60 Bulgaria 25
22 Guatemala 60  61 Cape Verde 25
23 Philippines 60  62 Czech Rep 25
24 Saudi Arabia 60  63 Mozambique 25
25 Serbia and Montenegro 60  64 Slovakia 25
26 Honduras 55  65 Spain 25
27 Kazakhstan 55  66 Chile 20
28 Nicaragua 55  67 Estonia 20
29 Oman 55  68 Hungary 20
30 Vietnam 55  69 Italy 20
31 Israel 50  70 Singapore 20
32 Jordan 50  71 Slovenia 20
33 Kuwait 50  72 USA 20
34 Malaysia 50  73 Germany 15
35 Russia 50  74 Costa Rica 10
36 Uganda 50  75 Greece 10
37 Zambia 50  76 Japan 5
38 Argentina 45  77 Switzerland 0
39 Colombia 45     
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